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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On Saturday November 29, 2014 voters in Taiwan (officially 
known  as the  Republic of China)  went  to the  polls to cast ballots 
for  mayors  and  city  council  members of  the  metropolitan  cities, 
mayors  and  councilors  of the  counties  and  provincial  cities, town- 
ship chiefs and councilors,  aboriginal district  chiefs and councilors, 
and   borough  and   village   chiefs.1      Sometimes  called   Taiwan’s 
 
1. For this author’s  assessment of Taiwan’s previous  elections,  see John F. Copper 
with George P. Chen,  Taiwan’s  Elections: Political Development and Democratization 
in the Republic  of China (Baltimore: University  of Maryland School of Law, 1984); John 
F. Copper, Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic  Promise (Baltimore: 
University  of Maryland School of Law, 1990); John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 1991 and 1992 
Non-Supplemental Elections: Reaching  a Higher State of Democracy (Lanham, MD: 
University   Press  of  America, 1994); John  F.  Copper, Taiwan’s  Mid-1990s  Elections: 
Taking  the Final Steps to Democracy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher, 1998); John  F. 
Copper, Taiwan’s 1998 Legislative  Yuan,  Metropolitan Mayoral  and City Council  Elec- 
tions: Confirming and Consolidating  Democracy in the Republic  of China  (Baltimore: 
University  of Maryland School of Law, 1999); John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2000 Presiden- 
tial and Vice Presidential Election: Consolidating  Democracy and Creating a New Era of 
Politics (Baltimore: University  of Maryland School of Law, 2000); John F. Copper, Tai- 
wan’s 2001 Legislative, Magistrates and Mayors Election: Further Consolidating  Democ- 
racy  (Singapore: World  Scientific/Singapore University   Press,  2002);  Taiwan’s  2004 
Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Democracy’s  Consolidation or Devolution 
(Baltimore: University  of Maryland School of Law, 2004); Taiwan’s 2004 Legislative 
Election: Putting  it in Perspective  (Baltimore: University  of Maryland School  of Law, 
2004); John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2006 Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council  Elections 
and the Politics of Corruption (Baltimore: University  of Maryland School of Law, 2006); 
John  F. Copper, Taiwan’s  2008 Presidential  and Vice  Presidential  Elections:  Maturing 
Democracy (Baltimore: University  of Maryland School of Law, 2008); John F. Copper;, 
Taiwan’s  2010 Metropolitan City Elections:  An  Assessment of  Taiwan’s  Politics and a 
Predictor of Future Elections (Baltimore: University  of Maryland School of Law, 2010); 
John  F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential/Vice  Presidential and Legislative  Elections: 
Assessing  Current Politics and Charting the Future (Baltimore: University  of Maryland 
School  of Law, 2012). 
Chosen  in this election  were 6 municipal  mayors, 375 municipal  councilors,  6 chiefs 
of indigenous districts in municipalities, 16 seats for county magistrates, 50 seats for 
indigenous districts  in municipalities, 16 seats for county  magistrates (city mayors),  532 
seats for county (city) councilors,  198 seats for township  chiefs, 2,096 seats for township 
councilors  and 7851 seats for village chiefs (buroughs). See “Taiwan  Local Elections  of 
2014,” Central Election Commission, viewed November 8, 2014 (online  at engweb.cec 
.gov.tw). 
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“midterms”, these  combined elections  are  held  at four-year inter- 
vals, scheduled in between its national presidential/vice presidential 
and  legislative  elections.  The  midterms are  now considered nearly 
as important as the  latter  elections,  one  of the  reasons  being  as of 
2014 all local elections  are  held  at the  same  time.2 
While  also labeled  “local  elections” virtually  all qualified  vot- 
ers choose  an official or officials to represent them.  In fact, accord- 
ing to the Central Election Commission this election  was the largest 
ever in Taiwan  in terms of the number of candidates elected  by the 
voters—11,130  in all.3  As a consequence over 200,000 poll workers 
were engaged  at around 15,600 polling stations  throughout Taiwan.4 
Out  of  all  the  levels  of  local  government where  candidates 
needed to  appeal  to  the  voters,  the  metropolitan cities  were  the 
most important. The combined population of the metropolitan cit- 
ies approaches 14 million, or around sixty percent of Taiwan’s total 
population.5   Originally  Taiwan  had  only  two  metropolitan  cities: 
Taipei  and  Kaohsiung.6   Prior  to  the  last  such  elections   in  2010 
Taipei  County  was  separated from  Taipei  Metro  and  designated 
“New Taipei”  or Xinbei.7  Kaohsiung Metro  and Kaohsiung County 
 
 
2. Taiwan has nine categories of elections.  Two are at the national level: presiden- 
tial and  vice presidential elections  and  legislative  elections.  Seven  are  local elections: 
municipal   mayors,   municipal   council   members,  county   magistrates  (city   mayors), 
county council members, township  chiefs, township  council members, and village heads. 
All are elected  for four-year terms,  the terms  of legislators  having been  changed  from 
three  to four years recently.  Further details  are provided by the Central Election Com- 
mission (online  at cec.gov.tw).  The decision  to hold elections  at the same  time for the 
seven  levels of local government, originally  broached in the  Legislative  Yuan  in 2008, 
was  made  in  2010. See  “Seven-in-one elections  to  take  place  in  2014,”  China  Post, 
March  10, 2010 (online  at chinapost.com.tw). 
3. Li Wen, “Nov. 29 polls set candidacy  record,” Taipei Times, November 14, 2014 
(online  at taipeitimes.com). 
4. “Campaigns heat  up for Taiwan  nationwide elections,”  Taiwan  Today,  Septem- 
ber  29, 2014 (online  at taiwantoday.tw). 
5. The total  population of the five metropolitan cities is 13,744,000. Taiwan’s total 
population is 23,024,956 (estimated as of July 2010). See “Taiwan,” The World Factbook 
published by  the  Central Intelligence Agency  (online  at  www.cia.gov/library/publica 
tions). 
6. Taipei  was made  a metropolitan city in 1967, Kaohsiung in 1979. They were so 
classified because  of their  size and their  political  and economic  importance (Taipei  be- 
ing the capital  and Taiwan’s largest  city and Kaohsiung the second  largest  city and Tai- 
wan’s largest  port). 
7. On  December 31, 2010 the  Ministry  of  Interior approved the  English  name 
“New Taipei  City.” See June  Tsai, “English  name  approved for New Taipei  City,” Tai- 
wan Today,  January 3, 2011 (online  at taiwantoday.com.tw). The  term  Xinbei  is used 
here  since it was the official name  during  the campaign  and the election.  The name  for 
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were combined into one unit. Taichung  City and Taichung  County, 
and Tainan  City and Tainan  County  respectively  were merged  and 
took  the  status  of metropolitan cities.8   Thus,  there  were  a total  of 
five   metropolitan  mayors   chosen.   This   time   there    were   six: 
Taoyuan County  was slated to be upgraded to a municipality and it 
was considered that  during  the  campaign. 
Before  the  campaign  began,  the  Election Commission estab- 
lished some new rules for this election:  Cell phones  were prohibited 
from voting booths  (with a fine for a violation  of up to NT$300,000) 
as was sending  text messages on election  day to solicit votes (a fine 
of NT$500,000). Some small changes were made in election proce- 
dures.  As with previous  elections  it was unlawful  for the  media  to 
publish  the  results  of opinion  polls ten  days prior  to voting  day.9 
As usual,  the  ruling  Nationalist Party  (or  Kuomintang, KMT) 
was expected to  win in the  northern part  of the  island,  while  the 
Democratic Progressive Party  (DPP) was anticipated to prevail  in 
the  south.  Pundits  speculated that  the  victor  in the  election  would 
accrue  an advantage in the  2016 presidential/vice presidential and 
the legislative elections;  in other  words, this election  was thought to 
forecast  the  results  of the  2016 election.10  Victorious  metropolitan 
mayors, especially in Taipei and New Taipei, were thought by many 
observers to be possible  nominees in the  future  for the  presidency 
and/or  vice presidency by one  or both  of the  two major  parties.11 
 
Taipei  County  is also spelled  Sinbei. In fact, there  was a dispute  over the spelling. The 
government and  the  KMT  favored  Xinbei  as this  was consistent with  the  spelling  of 
Chinese  in China  and  foreign  tourists  who have visited  China  would recognize  it. The 
DPP favored  Sinbei to avoid using the same spelling used in China. The China Post and 
the  Taipei  Times,  the  two main  English  papers  in Taiwan,  used  different spellings  re- 
flecting  their  different views. 
8. On October 4, 2010 the Central Election Commission decided  that all local elec- 
tions would be held at the same time as of 2014. That will include special municipalities, 
city mayors  and county  magistrates, city and city councilors,  township  chiefs, township 
representatives and  village and  ward  heads.  See “CEC  to bring local elections  in sync 
by 2014,” United  Daily  News, October 4, 2010 (online  at udn.com). 
9. “CEC  announces dates  for nationawide elections,”  Taiwan  Today,  August  22, 
2014 (online  at taiwantoday.tw). 
10. See Charles  Fuchs,  “The  Invisible  Candidate in Taiwan’s  Elections,”   Foreign 
Policy  (blog),  November 19, 2014 (online  at foreignpolicy.com). Only  the  Nationalist 
Party  or Kuomintang (KMT)  and  the  Democratic Progressive Party  (DPP) contested 
the metropolitan city mayor elections.  The Taiwan Solidarity  Union  (TSU) and the Peo- 
ple  First  Party  (PFP)  focused  on  lower  level  positions.  See  “CEC  says seven-in-one 
elections  to be held on Nov. 29,” Taipei Times,  January 22, 2014 (online  at tapeitimes 
.com). 
11. President Chen  Shui-bian  and  President Ma  Ying-jeou  were  both  mayors  of 
Taipei.  So was President Lee  Teng-hui.  Vice President We Den-yi  had been  mayor  of 
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During  the campaign  the media,  election  observers, and schol- 
ars pontificated very little about  a theory  or theories that might pre- 
dict the winners  and losers of the election.  This may be because  the 
models  and  constructs used  previously  to anticipate Taiwan’s  vot- 
ers’ choices had become  shopworn, had not worked  very well, or, as 
some  pointed out,  contradicted one  another.12  Rather, many  pun- 
dits  considered the  problems  faced  by the  two  major  parties  and 
how they  would  handle  them  as constituting the  best  predictor of 
this election’s outcome. They thought it was a matter of who would 
lose the  election  rather than  who would win.13 
Students of Taiwan’s elections,  including this writer, viewed the 
DPP,  for  reasons  inherent in the  party’s  makeup and  philosophy, 
perennial  disunity,   and  serious   disagreements  about   the  party’s 
stances toward  China and the United States, as incapable of appeal- 
ing to a broad  segment  of Taiwan’s electorate. This meant  the KMT 
had  an advantage. 
However, the  KMT  appeared fully capable  of losing the  elec- 
tion as reflected by the performances of a number of its members in 
the legislature, President Ma and his administration’s low popular- 
ity, and  what  many  considered its poor  record  in governance. In 
addition, serious  factionalism   and  centrifugal tendencies plagued 
the  Ma  administration and  the  Nationalist Party,  and  both  lost 
ground  on  important issues  to  voters  such  as  economic  manage- 
ment,  corruption, political  reform,  and some other  matters that  in- 
fluenced  voters. 
As the votes were counted, the media,  election  observers, and 
party  leaders  gave the victory with few caveats  to the DPP  and re- 
ported it was a loss for  the  KMT.  In  fact,  most  saw the  election 
results as proof  it was a big, even momentous, win for the DPP  and 
a shellacking  for the  KMT.  Many  opined  the  election  would  have 
very  profound consequences, including  making  it  likely  the  DPP 
would win the 2016 election  or elections.14 It would also impact  re- 
 
 
Kaohsiung. Frank  Hsieh, the DPP’s presidential nominee in 2008, was previously  mayor 
of Kaohsiung. 
12. For a discussion  of various  theories advanced to explain  the nature of Taiwan’s 
elections  and  predict  their  results,  see  John  F. Copper, The  KMT Returns  to Power: 
Elections  in Taiwan  2008 to 2012 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,  2013), 
13. See  Copper, Taiwan’s  2010 Metropolitan City  Elections,  pp.  18-19 for  details 
about  this idea  and  its acceptance compared to various  theories to predict  elections. 
14. It was still uncertain at this time whether the presidential/vice presidential elec- 
tion  and  legislative  election  would  be  held  together and  considered one  election  or 
whether they  would be held  separately. 
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lations  with China  and the United States.  Finally, a majority  of ob- 
servers  saw it as a plus for Taiwan’s democracy. 
 
II. PAN-GREEN’S HANDICAPS 
 
Looking  at  Taiwan’s  politics  broadly  against  the  backdrop of 
this election,  there  were strong reasons  to believe (at least initially) 
that  the  Democratic Progressive Party  (DPP) and  its ally the  Tai- 
wan Solidarity  Union  (TSU)  faced very fundamental disadvantages 
in appealing to voters.  Observers have  even  opined  that  they,  the 
pan-green (the  term  for the two parties), could not win this or any 
other  important election  for reasons  that were basic to the two par- 
ties’ very natures.15 
The  recent  history  of elections  in Taiwan  have  revealed that 
the DPP  regularly  encountered a “voter  threshold” and was unable 
to get more than thirty to forty percent of the popular vote in major 
political contests.  Some attribute this to the party’s “ideological  and 
symbolic”  politics  that  limits its appeal  in view of Taiwan’s  “prag- 
matic,   conservative electorate.”16    Others  cite   its  penchant  for 
“street politics”  (protest and demonstrations), its provincialism,  its 
preoccupation with local nationalism, and  other  traits.  In addition, 
the  DPP’s  voter  support base  is in the  southern part  of the  island 
that  is more  rural  and  less educated, less global (even  though  Tai- 
wan is dependent on foreign  trade), and where  citizens are less up- 
to-date with a changing  world.  Seeming  to confirm  this, the  DPP, 
the  dominant of the  two opposition parties  or pan-green’s leading 
party,  suffered  serious  defeats  in Taiwan’s  most  important recent 
elections:  the  2008 legislative  and  the  presidential/vice presidential 
elections,  the 2010 mid-term  elections,  and the 2012 combined pres- 
idential/vice  presidential and  legislative  election.17 
Another favorite  reason  proffered to support the view that  the 
DPP  cannot  win the support of a majority  of voters  is that the DPP 
lacks a reasonable and coherent China  policy. The party’s base and 
many of its activists  are hostile  toward  China  and support a policy 
of Taiwan’s independence. This translates into ignoring  China  and/ 
or angering  Chinese  leaders.  Either is a very benighted stance since 
 
15. See  Copper, The  KMT Returns  to  Power:  Elections  in  Taiwan  2008 to  2012 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,  2013), concluding  chapter. 
16. See Shelley Rigger,  “The  Democratic Progressive Party  in 2000: Obstacles and 
Opportunities,” China Quarterly,  December 2001, p. 946. 
17. See Copper, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections; Copper, 
Taiwan’s 2010 Metropolitan City Elections; and Copper, Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential/Vice 
Presidential and Legislative  Election. 
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China  has become  a global economic  juggernaut and Taiwan’s eco- 
nomic   health   is  increasingly   dependent  upon   interchange  with 
China.18  Underscoring this problem, cross-Taiwan Strait  commerce 
has  increased markedly in recent  years  while  trade  relations with 
the United States,  Europe, and Japan  is static.19 
Cordial  ties with China  are  even more  critical  to Taiwan  than 
direct commercial relations because  of Beijing’s economic  influence 
over other  countries in Asia, most notably  the nations  of Southeast 
Asia. After  January 2010, the China-ASEAN common  market was 
created, which virtually  gave China  a veto  over  participants’ com- 
mercial relations with Taiwan.20 The Economic Cooperation Frame- 
work Agreement (ECFA), an accord Taiwan reached with China in 
mid-2010 to ostensibly  fix this situation, promised  more amicable 
relations while further encouraging Taiwan-China trade  and  other 
economic  ties. This was accomplished by the  KMT.21 
China’s military and political/diplomatic influences  have also 
grown  exponentially.  Chinese   defense   budget   has  expanded  by 
double  digits almost  every year since 1991 and its total  is slated  to 
surpass U.S. military spending  in a decade  or so.22 No other  country 
in  Asia  (including   Taiwan)   has  come  close  to  keeping   up  with 
China’s   military   expansion.  Taiwan   is  especially   vulnerable to 
China’s  newly  acquired military  prowess  as  reflected in  various 
studies  assessing  a possible  Chinese  attack  on  Taiwan.23   Beijing’s 
 
 
18. In 2012, China contributed 26 percent to the growth of the global gross domestic 
product;  in 2013 it was 29 percent—more than  any other  country  in the world. Also by 
2013 half  of Asian  countries’  trade  was within  Asia.  Lowell  Dittmer, “Asia  in 2013: 
Peace and Prosperity amid Rising Tension,” Asian  Survey, January/February 2014, p. 2. 
19. In 2012, Taiwan’s exports  to China amounted to 39.4 percent of its total exports. 
The  U.S. took  less than  a third  of this or 11.0 percent;  Europe accounted for 9.8 per- 
cent;  Japan  was the  destination of 6.3 percent. See Republic  of China  2013 Yearbook 
published by the Office of Information Services, Executive Yuan  (online  at ey.gov.tw). 
Taiwan’s exports  to China were but 7 percent of its total in 1990 and 16 percent in 2000. 
See Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy: Meeting Chal- 
lenges,Pursuing  Progress (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Press,  2012), p. 97. 
20. The  China-ASEAN Free  Trade  Association (CAFTA) established in January 
2010, was designed  to create  a European Union-style common  market that  was both 
large  and  important (with  a population of 1.9 billion  and  a trade  volume  of $4.5 tril- 
lion). Critically  it excluded  Taiwan’s participation. 
21. “No  such thing  as free  trade,” Economist, June  25, 2010 (online  at economist 
.com). 
22. Sam Ro,  “China  Could  Be Spending  More  On  Its Military  Than  The  US. By 
2035,” Business  Insider,  January 13, 2013 (online  at businessinsider.com). 
23. See Armin  Rosen,  “Here’s  What the Pentagon Thinks a Chinese  Attack on Tai- 
wan Would  Look  like,” Business  Insider,  June  6, 2014 (online  at lbusinessinsider.com). 
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non-military influence  has also grown fast. The “Beijing consensus” 
has replaced the “Washington consensus” over a broad  front  while 
democracy has faded as a trend  among developing countries since it 
is seen  as faltering  in the U.S., Europe and Japan.24 
During  the  2012 election  campaign  TSAI  Ing-wen  and  other 
DPP  leaders  realized  that  the  DPP’s  China  policy  was unrealistic 
and was not winning it broad  public support. Tsai suggested  a “Tai- 
wan consensus”;  but even members of her party said this “idea”  was 
not  expressed very  cogently.  After  that  Tsai  spoke  only  vaguely 
about her China stance and generally tried to avoid the issue.25 Fol- 
lowing the election  defeat,  top DPP  leaders  acknowledged that  the 
party’s  China  policy  had  been  a serious  handicap. They  realized, 
partly  convinced  by post-election public  opinion  surveys,  that  his 
China  policy had helped  MA  Ying-jeou  win the election.26 
The DPP  made  efforts  to correct  this. Its subsequent “Report 
on the Presidential Election” recommended a pragmatic and mod- 
erate  line  on  cross-Strait policy  and  increased bilateral exchanges 
with  China  to  dispel  the  “stereotypical impression” that  the  DPP 
was  anti-Chinese. The  report  concluded that  the  “China  factor” 
would  play an even  bigger  role  in future  elections.27  Shortly  after 
the   report  was  made   public,   DPP   Chairwoman  TSAI   Ing-wen 
stated   that  her  party  must  “face  harsh  realities” and  “adjust   its 
cross-Strait policy.” She noted  in particular that  the people  of Tai- 
wan want  “stability  and  development” in relation to China.  How- 
ever,  Tsai  also  noted  that  Ma’s four  years  as president coincided 
with  an  “increase  in  support for  independence and  the  ‘fastest 
growth  ever’ in a Taiwanese  identity.”28 
Looking  at these  two statements, the  major  opposition party, 
or  at  least  Tsai,  was  obviously  conflicted.  Perhaps it  was  worse. 
 
 
24. See Stefan  Halper, The  Beijing  Consensus:  How  China’s Authoritarian Model 
will  Dominate the  Twenty-First   Century  (New  York:  Basic  Books,  2010).  Also  see 
Joshua  Kurlantzick, Democracy in Retreat: The Revolution of the Middle  Class and the 
Worldwide Decline of Representative  Government (New Haven:  Yale University  Press, 
2013). 
25. Copper, The  KMT Returns  to Poser, pp. 232-33. 
26. See, for example,  “Ma’s China  policy credited as key election  factor,”  Formosa 
Television  News, January 15, 2012. For more details, see Alan D. Romberg, “After Tai- 
wan’s Elections:  Planning  for the  Future,”  China  Leadership Monitor,  April  30, 2012 
(online  at chinaleadershipmonitor.com). Polls cited by the author indicated that  cross- 
Strait  policy was the  number one  issue explaining  Ma’s victory. 
27. Tung Hen-suan, “DPP  must change its China policy,” Taipei Times, May 1, 2012 
(online  at taipeitimes.com). 
28. Ibid. 
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Some even opined  that the DPP had not made a serious assessment 
of cross-Strait relations and was still in denial  about  the need  for a 
more  rational China  policy.29 
Shortly  after  Tsai’s election  defeat,  SU  Tseng-chang became 
DPP  chairman. Su held a number of meetings  to discuss China  pol- 
icy and hopefully  fix the problem. The upshot  of the discussions was 
a  promise   to  be  “more   flexible.”  However in  almost   the  same 
breath, Su declared he “hoped mainland  officials would make 
changes.”   Not  unsurprising he  did  not  elicit  a  positive  response 
from Chinese  leaders  in Beijing. In fact, China’s new top leader,  XI 
Jinping, subsequently stated  that political differences (which Su ob- 
viously wanted  to put  aside)  would  have  to be discussed  and  “not 
passed  on from generation to generation.”30    Apparently recogniz- 
ing that he had to please the party’s base, Su asserted that the DPP 
remained committed to its pro-independence stance.31 
After  more than a year with only a plethora of discussions and 
pronouncements transpiring in the interim,  Su had nothing  concrete 
to report about  the DPP’s China  policy. He described the relation- 
ship  as like  a man  walking  on  the  beach  that  sees  a seagull.  He 
advised  that if the man let the seagull alone  “both  will be happy.”32 
Pro-DPP  critics   called   Su’s  comment   “belittling”,  while   many 
others  compared his statement to TSAI  Ing-wen’s “Taiwan  consen- 
sus”, which was announced during  the 2012 election  campaign  and 
was followed  by the  DPP’s  defeat  at the  polls.33 
At nearly this same time, Mainland Affairs Council Minister 
WANG Yu-chi traveled to China and met his counterpart, Minister 
ZHANG Zijun,  head  of the  Taiwan  Affairs  Office.  The  media  la- 
beled  the encounter “historic” and a “breakthrough.” The KMT 
seemed  to be managing  China policy quite adroitly.  More than sixty 
percent of those polled in Taiwan supported the meeting.34 To many 
 
 
29. See Richard C. Bush,  Uncharted  Strait: The  Future of China-Taiwan Relations 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013), p. 163. 
30. For  details,  see Alan  D. Romberg, “From  Generation to Generation: Advanc- 
ing Cross-Strait Relations,” China Leadership Monitor, March 14, 2014 (online  at 
chinaleadershipmonitor.org). 
31. Jenny W. Hsu and Aries Poon,”  Taiwan Opposition Leader Willing to be ‘Flexi- 
ble’ with China,”  Wall Street Journal, August  1, 2012 (online  at wsj.com). 
32. “DPP  head  uses ‘gull on the beach’ analogy  for Taiwan-China ties,” Focus Tai- 
wan News  Channel,  January 14, 2014 (online  at focustaiwan.tw). 
33. “EDITORIAL: The myth of Taiwan’s China  policy,” Taipei Times, January 21, 
2014 (online  at taipeitimes.com). 
34. “Support for Wang-Zhang meeting  widespread: poll,”  Taipei  Times,  February 
28, 2014 (online  at taipeitimes.com). 
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uneasy  DPP  stalwarts  the  event  was seen  as bolstering President 
MA Ying-jeou’s  “mutual non-denial of jurisdiction” policy.35 
Relations with the United States constituted another elemental 
problem for the DPP. When President Richard Nixon made his his- 
toric  trip  to  China  in 1972 he  signed  the  Shanghai  Communique´ , 
where  the U.S. pledged  to adhere to a one-China policy. The U.S. 
has  not  since  veered  from  this  commitment. This  means  that  the 
U.S.  does  not  condone  Taiwan’s  independence—a fundamental 
ideal  of the  DPP  and  its supporters. This  became  a serious  issue 
during  the Chen  administration because  Washington began  to per- 
ceive that President Chen sought to provoke friction with Beijing or 
even conflict between Washington and Beijing in order  to maintain 
the  support of his base  and  cope  with  an  opposition that  held  a 
majority  in the legislature. This became  especially  troublesome for 
the  Bush  administration after  September 11, 2001 when  America 
was fighting  a war on terrorism (that  Beijing  had  pledged  to sup- 
port).  Washington detested being distracted by President Chen’s 
“antics”    and   Taipei’s   relations  with   Washington  deteriorated 
badly.36 
After  Chen left office, relations with the U.S. continued to be a 
problem for the DPP.  Party  officials expressed chagrin  over Wash- 
ington’s  unveiled  support of the  KMT  during  the  2008 and  2012 
election   campaigns,   even   criticizing   the   U.S.  publically   for  its 
“bias.”37 Yet getting along with its longtime friend and supporter 
(inasmuch as America virtually guarantees Taiwan’s continued exis- 
tence)  was  a  sine  qua  non-for  the  DPP.  In  addition, the  U.S.  is 
respected and popular among  Taiwan’s voters. 
This remained a serious  dilemma  for DPP  leaders  as little  or 
nothing  changed  with  the  Obama administration despite  DPP  ef- 
forts to curry Washington’s favor. In fact, President Obama during 
his first trip to China  concurred with China’s view that  Taiwan  is a 
“core  interest,” which was understood to mean  Taiwan  is Chinese 
territory. The Obama team  further praised  recent  improvements in 
 
 
35. Romberg, “From  Generation to Generation,” p. 17 footnote #28. 
36. See  John  F. Copper, “Why  the  Bush  Administration Soured  on  Taiwan,”  in 
Suisheng  Zhao  (ed.),  U.S.-China  Relations: Cooperation and Competition in Northeast 
Asia (London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2008). President Bush called President Jiang Zemin 
immediately after  the events  of September 11 and won Jiang’s support for the war on 
terror. 
37. See  Copper, Taiwan’s  Presidential/Vice  Presidential  and  Legislative  Elections, 
pp. 63-64. 
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cross-Strait relations, which could only be taken  as praise  for Presi- 
dent  Ma’s policies.38 
On  top  of  all  of  this  and  perhaps worse,  the  legacy  of  the 
CHEN  Shui-bian   presidency  amplified   the  handicaps  just  men- 
tioned  and  damaged the  DPP’s  brand  in a number of other  ways. 
Prior  to Chen’s presidency, the DPP  could claim with some justifi- 
cation  to be the  party  that  advanced reform,  minority  rights,  civil 
and political  liberties,  and democracy. But because  of Chen’s abor- 
tive efforts  to build  a coalition  government and  owing to his party 
being  in  the  minority  in  the  legislature, Chen  had  (or  perceived 
there  was no alternative) to fall back on his base for support. There- 
fore he (officially and energetically) promoted localism and the Fu- 
kien Taiwanese  national identity.39 In the process he abandoned the 
party’s  ideals  just mentioned.40 
Taiwan’s ethnic  minorities soon felt the sting of discrimination 
in government hiring and through a variety of its other  policies. The 
Aborigines, Hakka and  Mainland Chinese  were  targeted. The  ma- 
jority of each group had not voted for Chen, so he and the DPP had 
no reason  to believe they could count  on their  support now. Subse- 
quently,  top Chen  administration officials referred publically to the 
Mainland  Chinese   as  traitors  for  their   positive   feelings  toward 
China.  Some  top  Mainland Chinese  military  and  intelligence offi- 
cials felt  so estranged that  they  defected, causing  the  U.S.  to  be- 
come seriously concerned. The Hakkas were traditionally hostile 
toward  Fukien  Taiwanese  because  they purloined the Hakka’s  land 
and forced  them  into dangerous and less fertile  areas  in the center 
of the  island.  The  Chen  administration further alienated the  Hak- 
kas by promoting Taiwanese  (meaning Fukienese Taiwanese) lan- 
 
 
38. Bush,  Uncharted  Strait, pp. 221-22. . 
39. Taiwan’s  population is comprised of Aborigines, or the  original  inhabitants of 
Taiwan; two groups  of Taiwanese  (Chinese who migrated to Taiwan  in centuries past); 
and  Mainland Chinese,  who went  to Taiwan  after  World  War  II,. Aborigines are  less 
than 2 percent of the population. The two groups of Taiwanese  are  together 84 percent. 
Mainland Chinese  are  about  14 percent. Hakkas, who  are  one  group  of Taiwanese, 
comprise  around 15 percent of the  population. Fukien  Taiwanese, or Fukienese (also 
called Hoklo) are nearly  70 percent of the population and are considered the majority 
ethnic  group;  the  others  are  considered minorities. All  of the  minorities traditionally 
supported the KMT and did not shift their loyalties after the formation of the  DPP and 
did not  vote  for Chen  in 2000 or 2004. 
40. See John  F. Copper, “Taiwan  in Gridlock,” in John  F. Copper (ed.),  Taiwan  in 
Troubled Times: Essays on the Chen Shui-bian  Presidency  (Singapore: World Scientific, 
2002), pp. 42-48. Also  see Richard C. Bush,  Unchartered  Strait: The  Future of China- 
Taiwan  Relations  (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2013), p. 185. 
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guage,  culture,  etc.  The  Aborigines felt  the  government despised 
them  because  DPP  officials referred to  them  in derogatory terms 
while also suggesting  they were “polluting” Taiwan  and should  mi- 
grate  elsewhere.41 
Whether because  of frustration over  not  being  able  to govern 
as he had hoped  or due to arrogance and an aggressive  personality, 
President Chen  did not take  kindly to criticism from Taiwan’s free- 
wheeling media. Not long after entering office, Chen adopted an 
unfriendly mien  toward  certain  unsupportive and/or  critical 
magazines  and newspapers. He kept  most in line through selective 
purchasing advertisements and by favoring media  that were sympa- 
thetic to him and his party.  This was effective  in the context  of bad 
economic  times. But  there  were  those  that  did not  toe  the  line. In 
2002, the government seized 180,000 copies of Next magazine  for 
mentioning a government secret fund. The next year, a reporter was 
sentenced to eighteen months  in jail for writing about  a military 
exercise that was arguably  not secret. Subsequently, the Paris-based 
Reporters Without Borders downgraded Taiwan’s press freedom 
ranking  from  thirty-five  in the  world  in 2002 to sixty in 2004—be- 
low Albania, Botswana and  Ghana.42 
Meanwhile political reform,  which was a major  DPP  and Chen 
theme  before  2000 and during his campaign  that  year, was put hold 
or  forgotten. Real  democracy, transparency, justice,  and  fairness 
were  no  longer  mentioned. A  power  struggle  within  the  pan-blue 
coalition  trumped concern  about  these  things. The upshot  was that 
in some  respects  all of the  DPP’s  goals to reform  the  policy were 
less the  subject  of concern  than  they  had  been.43 
But the most serious blight caused to the DPP by the Chen 
presidency was its corruption. Before  and  during  the  campaign  in 
2000 the DPP  painted, generally  successfully, the KMT as the party 
of corruption and the DPP  as a clean party. This soon flipped when 
greed  and  dishonesty  from  Chen,  his cronies,  and  his relatives  be- 
came  a  canker  on  the  DPP’s  image.  This  began  with  rumors  of 
Chen  officials selling jobs and other  kinds of venal behavior.  Then 
the  media  reported that  President Chen’s  wife, the  first lady, was 
 
 
41. Copper, “Taiwan  in Gridlock,” pp. 96-98. 
42. See “2004 Taiwan  Civil Rights  Violation Report,” Taiwan  Civil Rights  Watch 
Group, p. 6 and  10-12; Chen  Ping-hung,  “State  ads  replace  professionalism,”  Taipei 
Times, January 17, 2007 (online  at taipeitimes.com); Taiwan Country  Report on Human 
Rights,  U.S.  Department of State,  Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,  and  Labor, 
March  8, 2006 (online  at lexisnexis.com). 
43. For  further details,  see. Copper, Taiwan”s  Democracy on Trial, pp. 73-76. 
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profiteering financially  from her position  in a host of ways, includ- 
ing influence  peddling  and  insider  stock  trading.44  President Chen 
did not seem to care about  the effects from either  of these activities. 
There  followed indictments of some of President Chen’s im- 
portant appointees.45 Following this the Prosecutor’s Office charged 
the first lady with stealing  government funds, forgery,  and perjury. 
She was subsequently convicted  in court.  Never  before  had  a first 
lady  been  found  guilty  of  a  crime.  At  the  time,  prosecutor Eric 
Chen  (no  relationship to  the  president but  his staunch  supporter 
and  a friend  of the  Democratic Progressive Party)  stated  that  he 
would have also indicted  President Chen had it not been for the fact 
that  as the  sitting  president he had  immunity.46 
The  atmosphere of corruption that  surrounded Chen,  his cro- 
nies, and  his relatives  eventually alienated both  party  leaders  and 
supporters and prompted some to criticize the president openly.  A 
former   party  chairman and  the  member of  the  opposition  who 
spent the longest time in jail of anyone  that opposed the KMT dur- 
ing the  authoritarian period,  SHIH  Ming-teh,  organized mass pro- 
test   demonstrations  calling   for   Chen   to   step   down.   Tens   of 
thousands of citizens donated money to Shih’s cause. The turnout at 
street  protest marches  exceeded the numbers at any such event ever 
in Taiwan’s history.47 
During  the  campaigns  for  the  legislative  election  in  January 
2008 and for the president and vice president in March,  candidates 
of  all  of  Taiwan’s  political  parties   condemned Chen’s  behavior. 
Frank   Hsieh  and  SU  Tseng-chang, DPP  candidates running   for 
president and vice president, called Chen’s corruption “disgraceful” 
and  studiously  avoided  mentioning Chen’s  name  during  the  cam- 
paign.  DPP  officials  spoke  of “starting over”—meaning trying  to 
get past the ignominy of the Chen era. Clearly the corruption of the 
Chen  presidency had  hurt  the  DPP  badly.48 
 
 
44. Ibid., p. 62. 
45. The  president’s deputy  secretary general  became  infamous  for  taking  payoffs 
when foreign  workers  employed on the Kaohsiung rapid  transit  system rioted  because 
they  were  not  paid.  Then  the  media  cited  Ma  Yung-cheng, a Chen  friend  and  Chen 
appointee, for receiving  a million dollar  bribe  for arranging appointments to the board 
of the Hua  Nan Commercial Bank.  Not long after  this officials appointed by President 
Chen  in the  Taiwan  National Railway  Administration were  implicated  for  receiving 
payoffs; bidding  for NT$17 billion  in contracts had  to be suspended. 
46. Copper, Taiwan’s Democrcy on Trial, p. 63. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Copper, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential and Vice-Presidential  Elections,  p. 31. 
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President Chen  admitted his guilt  and  apologized. When  the 
DPP  lost the legislative  election  in January 2008, Chen  called it the 
greatest defeat  since  the  party’s  founding  and  declared it was his 
fault  and  thus  resigned  as party  chairman. Later,  after  his convic- 
tion by the court, Chen said: “I cannot  continue to lie to myself and 
others,  and admit  to committing acts against  the law.” He went on 
to express regret for campaign dishonesty during four elections, in- 
cluding  both  his two runs  for Taipei  mayor  and  two for the  presi- 
dency. He mentioned specifically misstating  campaign  expenses  and 
secreting  money  in foreign  bank  accounts.49 
A number of Chen’s relatives  and associates  provided informa- 
tion to prosecutors about  his corrupt and illegal actions. Several tes- 
tified   in   court   against   Chen.    Foreign    governments  provided 
evidence  against  Chen  that  was used  at his subsequent trials.  The 
government of Switzerland offered  proof of Chen’s money launder- 
ing. Secret Chen funds had been transferred through banks in Hong 
Kong and Switzerland, a company  in the Virgin Islands,  and a trust 
in St. Kitts.  These  governments provided the  details.  The  govern- 
ment  of Singapore provided Taiwan’s prosecutors with information 
about  the Chen family’s ten bank accounts  there.  The United States 
government seized  properties in New York  City and  Virginia  that 
were  in the  president’s son’s name  and  gave testimony they  were 
purchased with monies the First Lady received  from Yuanta Securi- 
ties to  get  the  Chen  Administration’s approval for  it to  acquire  a 
financial  holding  company.50 
The  “Chen  albatross” around the  DPP’s  neck  was a problem 
that did not fade away. Rather the matter persisted and proved  very 
difficult for DPP leaders to manage or spin. The legal proceedings 
dragged  on partly  because  of the  nature of judicial  processes,  but 
also because  Chen  decided  belatedly to fight the  charges. 
Chen  recanted his admissions  of guilt and  asserted that  Presi- 
dent   MA   Ying-jeou   and   the   KMT   were   persecuting  him.  He 
adopted a victimization strategy,  which, based  on Taiwan’s culture, 
had  resonance.51   Many,  especially   his  avid  supporters,  believed 
Chen  was an innocent victim despite  the  evidence.  Chen  strength- 
 
 
 
49. See Copper, Taiwan’s Democracy on Trial, pp. 7-10. 
50. Samuel Rubenfeld, “US Seizes Ex-Taiwan Leader’s  Manhattan Condo,  Virginia 
House,”Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2012 (online  at wsj.com). 
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ened  his case  when  he  appealed his convictions,  thus  causing  his 
case to become  a protracted one.52 
Legal proceedings were not the only things that  kept  the Chen 
case alive. Chen  attracted broad  media  attention when he went on 
hunger  strikes and reportedly attempted suicide. He claimed bias in 
the judicial system and bad treatment in prison. Pro-Chen organiza- 
tions abroad, in particular in the United States,  repeated his claims 
and  found  sympathizers, including  President Ma’s mentor, former 
Harvard Professor Jerome Cohen,  and among  members of the U.S. 
Congress.53 
The Chen “case” thus presented an ongoing and deep dilemma 
for  the  DPP.  Party  leaders  as  well  as  supporters were  very  con- 
flicted regarding CHEN Shui-bian’s legacy. Praising  him and evok- 
ing his name  and that  of his presidency hurt  the party.  Yet this was 
effective  to rally the base, energize  the party,  and provide  focus on 
some core  issues. He  was the  party’s  first ever  and  only president. 
He  was charismatic and  was a hero  to  many  party  members and 
supporters.54 
The Chen presidency generated yet another problem:  The DPP 
acquired an image of not  being able  to promote economic  growth. 
This derived  in part  from the KMT’s reputation for having created 
the  “Taiwan  economic  miracle.”  It was reinforced by the  fact that 
President Chen  was in office only a short  time when Taiwan  exper- 
ienced  a recession  that  lowered  the  growth  of the  gross  domestic 
product (GDP) and  raised  unemployment to rates  that  many  peo- 
ple  had  never  experienced or  expected. The  DPP’s  socialist,  anti- 
business agenda  further contributed to the business community see- 
ing the party  as incompetent in managing  the economy.  Related to 
this, the  DPP  suffered  from  a perception that  it advocated protec- 
tionism   (especially   when  it  came  to  expanding  commerce  with 
China  was concerned). 
Likewise,  the DPP  was not a winner  on the issue of protecting 
social   stability,    including    handling    crime    and    other    related 
problems.  Harmony,  tranquility,  balance,   and  other   such  ideals 
were a part of Chinese culture and were the domain of the KMT. 
Networking, which  was  a  significant  Taiwan  asset  before  CHEN 
Shui-bian  became  president, was destroyed to a large extent,  espe- 
 
52. See   Alan   M.   Wachman,  Taiwan:   National   Identity   and   Democratization 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,  1994), p. 229 for background on the issue of victimization. 
53. William  Lowther, “US  representative hopes  to  meet  Chen  Shui-bian,” Taipei 
Times,  April  27, 2013 (online  at taipeitimes.com). 
54. Copper, “Taiwan  in Gridlock,” pp. 37-38. 
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cially  with   the   Overseas  Chinese,   by  promoting  local   Fukien 
Taiwanese  identity  and nationalism.55 
The DPP also faced a “demographic problem.” Taiwan had for 
some  years  experienced a very low birthrate. A  realization of the 
problem was painfully underscored when news was released in 2011 
that  Taiwan’s birthrate was the lowest in the world.56  Many  young 
people  simply did not  want  to get married, especially  women;  also 
many women  preferred foreign  husbands. In response,  men sought 
brides  from  China  or Southeast Asia.  Most  foreign  spouses,  espe- 
cially wives, became  residents and/or  citizens  but  did not  feel loy- 
alty  toward  the  DPP  (because of the  party’s  perception that  the 
spouses  did  not  understand or  sympathize with  local  nationalism 
and a Taiwanese  identity) and thus were more prone  to be potential 
KMT  voters.57 
A slow population growth rate, together with rising labor costs 
and local citizens becoming  less willing to take  menial  jobs, meant 
that  Taiwan  had  to  import  workers,  mainly  from  Southeast Asia. 
Like  foreign  spouses,  the “guest  workers” did not  understand Tai- 
wan’s  history,  especially  the  DPP’s  interpretation of  it.  Further- 
more,  they did not sympathize with the local nationalism advanced 
by the  DPP.  The  DPP  did  not  see  them  as sharing  their  national 
identity  and  did not  favor or like foreign  workers.58 
Meanwhile,  aging   created  the   need   for   more   government 
money  to help older  citizens, especially  for medical  care. But more 
public spending  meant  higher  taxes and a less competitive business 
sector, an issue that most people  were aware of. This, and a cultural 
generation gap, pitted  old against  young.  Young  people  were  con- 
cerned   about   jobs  and  became   enamored with  opportunities  in 
China  where  many  went  to  work.59  Young  people  also  had  little 
interest in  listening  to  their  elders’  complaints and  their  talk  of 
KMT authoritarianism and the white terror of the past. Many also 
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resisted  the  Chen  administration’s  campaigns  to  promote 
Taiwanization that  most  considered a “soft”  subject  that  was not 
useful in a competitive global world.60 In short, many thus lost their 
Taiwan  identity.  This portended badly for the DPP. 
Finally, the DPP  became  viewed as mimicking  the KMT when 
it made meaningful efforts to reform  or correct  the problems  previ- 
ously mentioned, in particular fixing the  relations with China,  and 
to  a lesser  extent  with  the  United States.  Some  DPP  leaders  de- 
scribed  this situation as a serious  conundrum.61 
 
III. PAN-BLUE’S TRAVAILS 
 
While the KMT and its allied parties do not suffer serious 
“fundamental” handicaps of the kind that  plague  the DPP,  it is not 
completely free  from  problems   that  may  be  considered inherent 
and/or  persistent.62  One  is that  the KMT has not been  as attentive 
to local political issues as the DPP  because  it views itself a national 
party; as a consequence it has not been  good at local governance.63 
This has created an obstacle  for the KMT when it comes to finding 
good candidates and campaigning effectively  in local elections.  The 
KMT also suffers from its authoritarian past even though  it was the 
primary  driver  behind  Taiwan’s  democratization. Voters  can,  and 
do, lose sight of the latter when the KMT has veered toward au- 
thoritarianism in its governing  practices.64 
More  importantly, in  terms  of  understanding the  2014 cam- 
paign, there  were problems  the KMT faced as the ruling party after 
2008 that  it and  the  Ma administration did not  handle  well. They 
made  mistakes,  did not explain policies cogently,  and did not main- 
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tain party unity. In fact, soon after the legislative and the presiden- 
tial/vice  presidential elections  in  January and  March  2008 
respectively, the  Ma  Administration, the  KMT-controlled  legisla- 
ture,  and the ruling party  all experienced a decline  in their  images. 
As a consequence, what looked  to be a strong mandate for all three 
at the  time  soon  eroded. 
During  the 2008 election  campaign,  KMT candidates for the 
legislature spoke  of taking their  jobs seriously, not getting involved 
in petty  partisan feuds, not abusing power,  and not getting mired in 
corruption (as they  charged  DPP  legislators  had).  But  this did not 
prove  true.  In fact, all of these  promises  were soon broken to some 
degree  or another. In addition, turf  battles  ensued  that  resulted in 
difficulties passing financial legislation, including even the govern- 
ment’s budget.65 As a result, citizens began to perceive that KMT 
legislators  as self-serving,  arrogant power  seekers.66 
President Ma’s halo likewise began to shine less brightly within 
a few months  after  he  was elected.  The  most  salient  cause  was a 
decline  in Taiwan’s  economic  growth.  The  global  recession  at that 
time hit Taiwan  especially  hard  because  of its high level of depen- 
dence  on  exports.  Economic contractions in  the  U.S.  and  Japan 
were especially damaging.  Many in Taiwan, rather than understand- 
ing or accepting  the reasons  the government offered  for the down- 
turn,  recalled  Ma’s oft-repeated campaign  pledge  turned slogan “6- 
3-3” (meaning 6 percent growth  in GDP,  3 percent or less unem- 
ployment and $30,000 annual  per capita  income).  To many citizens, 
Ma’s most  familiar  campaign  promise  turned out  to  be  empty  or 
false. Many had believed  Ma could return Taiwan to economic 
prosperity and  had  voted  for him for that  reason.67 
Then    natural  disaster    struck.    In   August    2009   Typhoon 
Morakot, the  worst  typhoon in most  peoples’  memories (the  most 
severe  in  fifty  years),  made  a  direct  hit  on  Taiwan.  It  destroyed 
more  than  seven  thousand homes,  thirty-four bridges,  and  large 
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stretches of roads.  Damage to crops was extensive.  More  than  five 
hundred people  died  due  to floods and  mudslides.68 
For  a  host  of  reasons,  his  handling  of  the  tragedy  seriously 
dented President Ma’s reputation. The presidential office had criti- 
cized the Central Weather Bureau the previous  year and had prom- 
ised better performance. But the forecasters made  a big error:  they 
announced that the brunt  of the storm would hit further north  than 
it did. Then  President Ma took  the  position  that  local government 
should  assume  a central  role in handling  the after-effects of the ty- 
phoon,  while the central  government would play a supporting role. 
This  theoretically may  have  made  sense,  but  local  governments 
were not capable  of doing what was needed. In any case, most citi- 
zens expected the national government to act decisively  and effec- 
tively, but  it did not.69 
In response,  100,000 demonstrators assembled in front  of the 
Presidential Palace  to  complain   about   the  poor  handling  of  the 
havoc and destruction caused  by the typhoon. In October, on Ret- 
rocession  Day  (October 25), half  a million  turned out  to  protest. 
Ma’s persona seemed  to be weak.  The  media  portrayed President 
Ma  as  unprepared,  confused,   aloof,  and  uncaring.   As  a  conse- 
quence,  Ma’s public approval,  as reflected in various  opinion,  polls 
fell to an unprecedented low.70 
President Ma’s image  seemed  seriously  affected.  In  any case, 
the DPP  and the TSU worked  hard  to ensure  this was the case and 
to  exploit  it. Broadly  speaking,  the  situation can  be  explained as 
follows: During  the election  campaign,  the opposition depicted Ma 
as a scholar  that  was introverted, weak,  and  someone who lacked 
the  leadership qualities  needed to function  well in Taiwan’s rough 
and tumble  democracy. Ma’s defenders argued  that his style of gov- 
ernance, which emphasized consensus,  was what was needed given 
Taiwan’s  very  divisive  and  chaotic  politics  that  had  been  made 
worse  by former  president CHEN Shui-bian.  In any case, citizens’ 
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view on the role of the president and the government became  much 
more  polarized at this time.71 
As a result,  public discourse  focused  on President Ma’s leader- 
ship  qualities  rather than  his personal stature or  what  he  accom- 
plished or even the difficulties he faced as president. One writer 
describes  the situation this way: President Ma was a Confucian-style 
“enlightened ruler”  that had created hopes that were hard to fulfill. 
When   expectations  were  not  met,  cynicism  resulted.72   In  other 
words, Ma was a good leader  who, despite  his talents,  was not able 
to solve his country’s problems. A special problem was that Taiwan 
was  much  divided  based  on  the  matter of  national identity   and 
whether in the future  Taiwan should be independent. In the eyes of 
the public Ma’s position  was unyielding.  Hence  ruling by consensus 
was difficult  or nearly  impossible  to engineer. After  the 2008 elec- 
tion, the opposition parties  reverted to their  traditional role of pro- 
test,  which they  were  very adept  at.73 
The public’s perception of President Ma’s performance showed 
a marked improvement in late  2009 as the  economy  sparked and 
the GDP  grew by a whopping  9 percent. This showed  that  citizens’ 
evaluations of President Ma and the KMT’s performance hinged 
largely on the vigor of the economy.  A high rate  of growth  contin- 
ued  into  2010 and  succored   the  KMT,  in  combination with  the 
handicaps the  DPP  faced  mentioned above,  to  win the  combined 
local elections  late  that  year.74 
This economic  growth in GDP  continued through 2011, though 
not  at the  phenomenal rate  of late  2009 and  2010. In any case, in 
early 2012 President Ma was reelected and the KMT won the simul- 
taneous legislative  election,  though  neither performed as  well  as 
they had in 2008.75  In other  words, the KMT was still popular with 
voters;  but  it was not  as favored  as it had  been. 
Still, the  2012 KMT  election  victory  must  also  be  seen  from 
another perspective: the  costs it incurred. Ma and  his ruling  party 
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took  some actions  during  the campaign  that  had a delayed  price to 
pay. President Ma froze  energy  prices  during  the  campaign.  Thus, 
after the election he had to oversee a steep rise in oil prices and a 
subsequent spike  in  electricity   bills.  Many  citizens  felt  Ma  had 
delayed  the  decision  until  he no  longer  needed their  votes.76  An- 
other  matter was the fact the government required new sources  of 
revenue. This  was ignored  during  the  campaign.  Post-election the 
Ma administration proposed a capital  gains tax on securities’  trans- 
actions.  The tax was touted as a means to alleviate  the growing gap 
between rich and  poor  and  as a needed source  of revenue given a 
serious  government budget  deficit. But the bill became  the topic of 
tough,  and at times rancorous, debate and got watered down in the 
legislature. Ma’s  finance  minister  resigned,  and  his  new  minister 
had  to admit  that  it would not  raise  much  revenue.77 
Taiwan then got into a dispute  with the United States over 
American beef imports.  The opposition exploited  the issue: DPP 
leaders  charged  it was a matter of public safety and that  President 
Ma and  the  KMT  tried  to cover  that  up. The  tiff with the  United 
States over the beef issue proved  to be a serious distraction for both 
Ma and  the  KMT.78 
The economy  continued to plague the Ma administration. Eco- 
nomic growth was below par. While it did not worsen, perceptions 
mattered and  they  were  in large  part  determined by comparisons 
with 2009-2010 and  with Taiwan’s neighbors. Regarding the  latter, 
Taiwan’s  GDP  growth  trailed  the  other  three  Asian  “small  drag- 
ons”  (South  Korea,  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore), which the  public 
looked  to as a point of reference. Furthermore, Taiwan was the only 
one of twelve major  Asia-Pacific  economies  to experience negative 
growth  in exports.  Many  saw the  problems  as resulting  from  a de- 
cline in foreign investments and a growing gap between inward  and 
outward capital  movements (incoming  investments totaled $4.9 bil- 
lion,  outgoing   was  $18 billion).79   During   2012, forecasts   for  the 
growth   in  Taiwan’s  GDP   were  thus   downgraded  a  number  of 
times.80 
Economic malaise persisted into 2013, a year before  the sched- 
uled  local elections  under  study  here,  during  which time  some  ob- 
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servers began to attribute the situation to factors  other  than the 
underperforming global  economy  and  bad  fortune. For  example, 
the  government’s fiscal deficits  were  making  it difficult  to take  ef- 
fective measures to stimulate economic  growth.  Taiwan’s ability to 
export  intermediate goods to China was shrinking  as China became 
the “world factory”  and could produce almost anything  at any stage 
of production. Taiwan’s low increases  in spending  on technology (in 
comparison to its neighbors like South Korea,  Japan,  and China) 
amplified  this problem.81 
In 2013, a number of other  issues or incidences  (some  turned 
scandalous) further undermined President Ma’s reputation as well 
as that  of his party.  Some were simply inadvertent or bad luck. But 
others  mirrored less than skillful handling  of some important issues 
by the president and his administration. Generally it did not matter 
much  which. 
In June,  the government signed a trade  pact with China  called 
the   Cross-Strait  Services   Trade   Agreement.  The   arrangement, 
which was designed  to  free  up  trade  in services,  was favorable to 
Taiwan.  Taiwan’s  services  companies   were  already   operating  in 
China  and it seemed  that  they were well positioned to take  advan- 
tage of the agreement. Both  the media  and the opposition took  no- 
tice of its benefits  and  the  pact  seemed  to face smooth  sailing.82 
But some companies  were obviously going to be hurt  and they 
began to complain.  There  were also allegations that the fine print in 
the  arrangement would  result  in an  influx  of Chinese  workers,  a 
very sensitive  issue in Taiwan.  The DPP  called for a careful  review 
of all the provisions  in the agreement—which had not been done in 
order  to prevent nitpicking  from  wrecking  the  negotiations.83 The 
opposition depicted the arrangement as a deal made  with China  to 
win the hearts  and minds of Taiwan’s residents, or put another way 
to lull Taiwan into accepting  Beijing’s ultimate aim of prodding Tai- 
wan into  giving up its sovereignty.84 
In July, a scandal  occurred that  the opposition could (and  did) 
easily exploit.  An Army  corporal, HUNG Chung-chiu,  died during 
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training  of heatstroke. The  death  became  instant  news and  engen- 
dered  questions in the public’s mind about  military  personnel poli- 
cies. Hung’s family opined  that his death  was the result of excessive 
exercise forced on him as punishment for taking a Smartphone onto 
an army  base.85  The case promptly became  a cause ce´le`bre for op- 
ponents of the  government and  the  KMT  (since  most  of the  top 
brass of the military were KMT supporters). Soon, a reportedly one 
hundred thousand people  rallied  in Taipei  to  demand justice  for 
Hung.  The upshot  was thirty-seven military  officers were punished 
for  the  incident   –  four,  including   a  colonel,   were  detained  on 
charges of abuse of authority.86 The opposition made points against 
the  Ma administration as a result. 
This incident, unclear changes in Taiwan’s defense policy, and 
concern that Taiwan was fast falling behind in its deterrence capa- 
bilities  vis-a` -vis China,  all had  an unwanted impact  on the  Ma ad- 
ministration for months.87  It was especially  troublesome in view of 
the fact that  Ma had put in motion  a plan to end compulsory mili- 
tary  service in Taiwan  by the  end  of 2015 and  replace  it with four 
months  of military  training  for males over the age of twenty.88 The 
question was: Would  Taiwan  have enough  recruits? 
At  almost  this same  time  Taiwan’s  fourth  nuclear  plant  once 
again became  a hot  potato politically.  The matter had seemed  set- 
tled  after  the  2012 election.  President Ma  and  the  KMT  favored 
nuclear  power.  The  DPP’s  candidate TSAI  Ing-wen  did  not.  Ma 
won the election, ostensibly putting the issue to rest. The business 
community argued  Taiwan  needed the  plant  and  the  public gener- 
ally agreed.  Finally,  people  in Taiwan  wanted  clean  air.89  Further- 
more,  not  building  the  plant,  which  was  ninety  percent  finished, 
would be a waste and it would cause electricity  costs to rise report- 
edly  by  nearly  fifteen  percent and  drag  the  GDP  down  by  0.43 
percent.90 
But  the  nuclear  disaster   in  Japan   in  2011 and  its  aftermath 
gradually  diluted  the arguments for nuclear  power  in Taiwan.  Tai- 
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wan  was in an  earthquake zone  (like  Japan). Taipower, Taiwan’s 
major producer and marketer of energy, was building the plant, un- 
like other  plants that were constructed by foreign companies. Some 
people  felt Taipower did not have the expertise required. The argu- 
ment  that  the  plant  would  provide   cheap  electricity  was  under- 
mined when electricity  rates were increased and then when the 
government stepped in to minimize  the  effects. All of this made  it 
appear that  the mounting cost of power  was  a spurious  argument. 
Lastly, some experts,  who were brought in, concluded that  the new 
plant  was not  safe.91 
In early September an even bigger issue arose  when President 
Ma  publically  accused  legislative  speaker and  colleague   WANG 
Jin-pyng  of corruption. Specifically  Wang  was charged  with  influ- 
ence peddling  for his lobbying  on behalf of DPP  whip KER  Chien- 
ming, who had been indicted  in a breach  of trust case. Ker had been 
found  not guilty, but the case was appealed and Wang tried  to use 
his influence  on the minister  of justice and the prosecutor to block 
that  process.  President Ma  had  the  KMT  expel  Wang  from  the 
party  thus disqualifying  him from serving as speaker, a role that  he 
had  held  for fourteen years.92 
This move by Ma was seen to have deeper roots: The two had 
earlier  competed for  the  KMT’s  chairmanship (in  2005)  and  the 
party’s  presidential nomination (in  2008).  Each  did  not  like  the 
other. Their feud also carried with it an ethnic element: Ma being 
Mainland Chinese  and Wang  Fukien  Taiwanese.93  Then  there  was 
the view (espoused by Ma and many others) that  Wang controlled 
the  movement of bills through the  legislature, often  not  in accord 
with the president’s agenda.  In other  words, Wang was an obstruc- 
tionist. WANG Chien-shien, President of the Control Yuan (the or- 
gan  of  government  that   deals   with  corruption), described the 
situation this  way: Even  though  the  KMT  held  eighty-four of the 
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one  hundred and  thirteen seats  in the  legislature the  ruling  party 
had  accomplished very  little  from  2008 to  date  because  the  DPP 
“had a choke hold on the KMT” owing to Wang’s inability to make 
things  work,  though  many  others  described the  situation as Wang 
working  in collaboration with  the  DPP  against  Ma.94  Thus  it was 
clear that  Ma wanted  to get rid of Wang  – his corruption may not 
have  been  the  main  and  only reason. 
Wang  appealed the  decision  to  revoke  his party  membership 
and remained a party  member and speaker temporarily. Following 
this,  President Ma  announced there   would  be  a  counter-appeal. 
Ma’s supporters said Wang was clearly guilty of corruption and de- 
served punishment. But that argument was not to carry the day, to a 
large degree  because  the means  used to get the evidence  on Wang 
seemed  to overstep constitutional limits.95 
Wang found  support for his position  with the public, the DPP, 
and  even  some  in the  KMT.  LIEN  Chan  and  his son, Sean  Lien, 
who was expected to be the KMT’s candidate for Taipei mayor, 
criticized Ma. President Ma’s position  was also hurt by the fact that 
the news broke  out when Wang was out of the country  to attend his 
daughter’s  wedding.  Thus,  Ma seemed  mean-spirited. Then  it was 
learned specifically how information on Wang’s deeds was ob- 
tained—from wiretaps  or  spying  on  Wang.  Many  people  thought 
this was wrong. Thus the case against  Wang  was tainted.96 
One  also needs  to note  the context  of the “Wang  affair.”  The 
milieu was the widely publicized  Snowden  case. Edward Snowden, 
who  was an  employee of a company  that  had  contracts with  the 
U.S. National Security Agency (NSA)  had defected at this time and 
released unknown (or not yet cognizable) information about  NSA’s 
spying on ordinary American citizens and foreigners by intercepting 
telephone calls in the United States and elsewhere and by collecting 
vast troves  of data  from  clandestine sources. 
The Snowden  case had special resonance in Taiwan because 
Snowden  made individual  privacy and overreaching government, 
already  a concern,  an issue that triggered public consternation. Fur- 
thermore, Snowden  had  fled to Hong  Kong, which is close to Tai- 
wan geographically (but in many other  ways as well), and is a major 
source   of  foreign  news  in  Taiwan.  There   was  even  speculation 
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(though  no  doubt   not   really   warranted)  for  a  short   time   that 
Snowden might move to Taiwan because Taiwan has no extradition 
treaty  with the U.S.97 The Snowden  issue also attracted more atten- 
tion than it might have otherwise because  most citizens in Taiwan at 
least knew vaguely of NSA operations in Taiwan to spy on China.98 
President Ma also lost public confidence because  he and his 
administration got  bogged  down  in  less  important issues,  which 
kept him from handling critical problems such as the economy. 
Meanwhile, corruption  became   a  problem  notwithstanding  Ma’s 
high standards of honesty.  A  number of officials were  accused  or 
were  indicted  for corruption, most  of them  KMT.99  Ma continued 
to have difficulty with the legislature not passing bills even though 
his party  had a workable majority.  The situation precipitated inter- 
party  feuding  and  bad  morale  in the  ruling  party  and  the 
government. 
Some  observers summarized the  situation by suggesting  that 
Ma suffered  the curse of a second-term presidency.100 Underscoring 
that  assessment, there  were  rumors  and  reports in the  media  of a 
conspiracy  of the so-called  “four  families”  of top KMT leaders  that 
had  allied  against  Ma  and  were  set to  blame  him  if the  party  did 
poorly  in the  2014 election.101  All of this portended badly  for the 
KMT  and  its candidates in the  November election. 
Amplifying  the KMT’s problems  at the national level, its local 
leaders  were not faring well. Local DPP  leaders  took  top honors  in 
CommonWealth magazine’s  recent  local  leaders’  approval survey. 
Not  only were they rated  higher  because  they were more  stable  in 
their  job  performances, but  they  were  seen  as more  capable  and 
devoted to their  work. Pundits  attributed the poor  ratings  of KMT 
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officials to scandals and their  lack of new programs at a time when, 
due  to the  sluggish economy,  people  were  hungry  for ideas.102 
In the  fall of 2013, in the  milieu  of news about  party  disunity 
and  its unpopularity with voters,  the  ruling  Nationalist Party  held 
several  meetings  to decide  on its candidates for the various  offices. 
The   process   revealed  internal  disputes   over   the   KMT’s  likely 
choices  and  other  problems. Former Vice President LIEN  Chan’s 
son,  Sean  Lien,  was the  most  popular KMT  candidate for  Taipei 
mayor. But Premier JIANG Yi-huah  was mentioned as a candidate. 
President Ma  favored  Jiang.  (The  current mayor,  HAU Lung-bin 
could not run due to a two-term limit.) Eric Chu, the KMT’s mayor 
of New Taipei  would presumably run again, though  Interior Minis- 
ter LEE  Hong-yuan was reportedly a possibility.  There  was specu- 
lation  that  Chu wanted  to prepare to run for president in 2016 and 
would not run for mayor. Jason  Hu, the current mayor of Taichung 
was assumed  to be running  again; but there  were doubts  about  this. 
He  expressed a desire  not  to  run  and  it was reported he  wanted 
instead  an  appointed position  in the  central  government. YANG 
Chiu-hsing,   former   magistrate  of  Kaohsiung  County   who   ran 
against  the current Mayor  CHEN Chu in 2010 was seen as a likely 
contender again  but  few gave him any chance  of winning.103 
In November, the KMT held its nineteenth party congress after 
rescheduling the event  due to internal problems  and expected pub- 
lic protest demonstrations. The  venue  was Taichung,  which  party 
leaders  viewed as critical to winning the election  there  a year later. 
Various  civic and  other  organizations, including  labor  groups,  ap- 
peared on the scene to protest KMT policies and political/economic 
conditions in Taiwan.  It  was reported they  brought ten  thousand 
pairs  of shoes  to  represent discontent with  President Ma  and  the 
government. According to the  Deputy Minister  of Interior, twelve 
hundred police were mobilized  and five hundred barbed-wire barri- 
cades were used to ensure  the meeting  could proceed.104 The situa- 
tion  was  not  a  propitious for  the  KMT  at  the  beginning  of  the 
election  campaign. 
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IV. PRE-ELECTION POLITICS 
 
The  year  2014 began  with  politics  in Taiwan  being  driven  by 
efforts of the political parties  to perform well in the upcoming  elec- 
tion. At center  stage the KMT and the DPP  geared  up to do battle 
with  the  other.  As  a  result  Taiwan  became  more  polarized than 
usual.  In short,  it was election  season  in spades. 
 
A.    State of the Economy 
 
The most salient  issue and the one that  appeared to undergird 
the  political  contest  and  seemed  to  constitute the  major  determi- 
nant  of its results,  both  anticipated and  real,  was the  state  of the 
economy.  The  situation seemed  to resemble the  period  before  the 
2010 local  elections:  the  economy  was  improving  and  maybe  fa- 
vored  the party  that  was in charge,  namely  the KMT; alternatively 
it was too  late  and  to date  it had  little  impact  on voters.105 
Early  in 2014, the  status  of the  economy  as shown  by surfeit 
data  was not  good (by Taiwan’s standards as least).  The growth  in 
Taiwan’s GDP  had ended  at two percent in 2013. Forecasts for 2014 
were a bit better, but well below the expectations of most citizens. 
Especially  important in terms  of the  ruling  party  winning  voters’ 
support in  November was  the  fact  that  Taiwan’s  GDP  increases 
were still below the other  “small dragons” that served as the bench- 
mark  by which Taiwan’s economic  performance was gauged.106 
Factors  said to be dragging  Taiwan’s economy  down were the 
global economy,  especially slow growth in three  of Taiwan’s impor- 
tant trading  partners: the United States, Japan  and Europe. Stagna- 
tion  in information products, electronics and  some  other  areas  in 
particular hurt  as  well.  Domestic factors  holding  back  economic 
growth  were said to be overregulation of the economy,  high taxes, 
poor  government planning,   and  ineffective   communications  with 
the  business  community.  Joining  regional  organizations was also a 
problem.107 China’s economy  continued to do well and made up for 
slow growth  elsewhere;  but this was a double-edged sword for Tai- 
wan as it increased Taiwan’s political worries, especially its growing 
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economic  dependence on China that was widely seen to imperil Tai- 
wan’s sovereignty. 
The  government and  KMT  officials attributed the  slow grow- 
ing economy  mainly  to  international economic  conditions and  ar- 
gued that  good relations with China  had helped  Taiwan  from what 
would  otherwise have  been  a  much  worse  economic  situation.108 
The DPP contended that commerce with China had not helped  Tai- 
wan much and, in fact, was in a number of respects  a negative  since 
the  linkage  had  resulted in many  of Taiwan’s industries being  hol- 
lowed  out  while investment capital  that  should  have  been  used  in 
Taiwan went to China.109  DPP  leaders  and spokesperson also cited 
poor KMT governance and “hair brained schemes”  to stimulate the 
economy  that  only diverted attention and/or  didn’t  work. 
In his New Year’s  Day  (Lunar New Year)  address,  President 
Ma made  the  economy  his central,  almost  exclusive,  focus. He  ad- 
mitted  that  growth  was slow and  did  not  meet  expectations, and 
there  was disappointment in salaries,  employment, and  other  eco- 
nomic conditions. He  also confessed  that  Taiwan’s growth  was be- 
hind  the  other   small  Asian  dragons,   and  Taiwan  was  lagging  in 
industrial restructuring and regional  economic  integration. He said, 
however,  that  Taiwan  had  been  second  only  to  Singapore among 
the  dragons  during  the  first  four  years  of his presidency and  that 
growth  had  averaged over  three  percent during  that  period  com- 
pared  to growth in the global economy  of 1.9 percent;  furthermore, 
that  inflation  and  unemployment had  been  kept  below  that  of the 
developed countries. The  president pledged  to make  the  economy 
better and cited the free economic  pilot zones proposed in August 
2013 and five “key areas”  of his administration’s focus on develop- 
ment: smart logistics, the international health  industry,  value-added 
agriculture, financial  services, and  educational innovation. He  pre- 
dicted  that  the  value  of goods  and  services  produced in the  pilot 
zones  would reach  NT$1 trillion  by 2015.110 
The  early  months  of 2014, however,  provided reason  for only 
guarded optimism  regarding a pickup  in the economy.  Taiwan’s ec- 
onomic  monitoring score  was down  two  points  in January due  to 
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declines   in  industrial  production,  manufacturing  and  exports.111 
Subsequently, the economic  news was both  good and bad. Growth 
in  the  GDP  got  a  stimulus  from  Chinese  New  Year.  Exports to 
China fell, while exports  to the U.S. and Europe rose slightly. Man- 
ufacturing output dropped, but  growth  in the  computer, semicon- 
ductor  and electronics fields showed  some increases  and moderate 
promise.  In February, consumer confidence rose to its highest level 
in two years.112 The Ministry of National Defense reported that the 
slow economy  precluded reaching  the three  percent of GDP  spend- 
ing goal.113 The International Monetary Fund predicted 3.8 percent 
growth  for the year; other  organizations predicted a slower growth 
rate—around 3 percent.114 
By late spring the economic  news was better. Forecasts by vari- 
ous organizations on Taiwan’s  growth  for the  year  increased a bit 
based  on upward  ticks in wholesale  and retail  sales and capital  for- 
mation.  However, China’s slowing economy,  increased competition 
with Chinese  businesses,  and slow growth  among  developing coun- 
tries continued to be a drag on growth. Exports overall grew, led by 
sales to the United States.  A big improvement was seen in the rate 
of unemployment, which fell to 3.85 percent in May—the  lowest in 
nearly  six years.115 
In the summer  there  were continued improvements on the eco- 
nomic  front.   Second   quarter growth   was  higher   than   predicted 
based on better economic  conditions in the U.S. and China  that 
stimulated Taiwan’s exports.  Europe, however,  was a different mat- 
ter.  Unemployment showed  a continued, though  small, drop.116 
At that point, it was uncertain how a somewhat improved 
economy  would affect voters  in November. That  seemed  to depend 
on how effective KMT candidates were at putting  a positive spin on 
it and how effective  DPP  candidates were at playing it down while 
interpreting the  government’s policies  toward  China  as leading  to 
perilous  economic  dependency. Meanwhile the KMT sent the mes- 
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sage that  the DPP  hoped  for a bad economy  and it took  actions  in 
that  direction to improve  their  candidates’ chances  at the  polls.117 
DPP  officials  and  supporters questioned the  optimistic  eco- 
nomic data in a variety of ways. They argued  that per capita income 
was below 1998 rates.118 They contended that  the Economic Coop- 
eration Framework Agreement of 2010 had resulted in big business 
interests in Taiwan making large profits, which they used to support 
Beijing’s efforts to purchase newspapers and TV companies  to 
propagandize and  to “buy”  Taiwan  instead  of trying  to conquer it 
with military  force.119 They attacked the Cross-Strait Service Trade 
Agreement for  not  being  transparent because  it would,  they  said, 
cause  an outflow  of management and  skilled  workers  to China.120 
This is why, they  said, the  agreement became  bogged  down  in the 
legislature.121 Opponents also hit President Ma’s pilot zones for the 
possible  damage  they would cause to Taiwan’s agriculture.122 
 
B.    Sunflower Student Movement 
 
The  second  important factor  affecting  voters  in Taiwan  in the 
run-up  to the election  was a string of protest movements and dem- 
onstrations orchestrated, or  at  least  supported, by the  opposition. 
They focused  attention on the matter of Taiwan’s democracy being 
in danger  and its loss of sovereignty (and  the two were connected) 
due to China’s efforts to undermine both. According to the opposi- 
tion, both  Taiwan’s democracy and its sovereignty were also being 
trashed by actions of the Ma government and the KMT. The protes- 
tors declared that  it was their  job to protect and advance  Taiwan’s 
democracy.123 
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The  KMT’s  position  was  that:  (1)  Taiwan’s  sovereignty had 
been placed in danger  more by the previous  Chen administration in 
terms of the trend  toward  economic  dependency on China; (2) Tai- 
wan’s security  was assured;  (3) Taiwan  was in better hands  due  to 
Ma’s good  relations with  Taiwan’s  protector (the  United States); 
and finally (4) Taiwan  needed commercial ties with China  in order 
to  maintain its economic  health  (like  other  countries in the  area 
whose sovereignty was not made an issue) given China’s role as the 
economic  juggernaut in the  region.  They  also argued  that  the  pro- 
test  was in many  instances  illegal and/or  incited  violence,  both  of 
which reflected Taiwan’s democratic system was being devolved  by 
the  opposition.124 
The  first important protest movement was the  Sunflower  Stu- 
dent  Movement. It began  on March  18 and lasted  to April  10. The 
term  sunflower  was a symbol  of hope  and  was an  allusion  to  the 
Wild Lily Movement in 1990 that  to some  was considered a mile- 
stone in Taiwan’s democratization. The stated reason for the protest 
was the  Cross-Strait Service  Trade  Agreement, specifically  that  it 
should not have been put to the legislature without  an item-by-item 
debate on its provisions.  Also protesters said it would hurt Taiwan’s 
economy  and  make  Taiwan  vulnerable to  Chinese  political  influ- 
ence. Advocates said it would help improve  Taiwan’s economy  and 
rejecting  it would create  an impediment to reaching  other  trade 
agreements and would hurt  Taiwan’s international credibility.125 
During  the height  of the movement protestors occupied  the 
legislature for several days, the first time this ever happened in Tai- 
wan. Riot  police were called. Some police and some students were 
injured.  On  March  20, the  student leader  of the  movement called 
for  a mass  rally.  Organizers said  500,000 people  participated; the 
police estimated the number at 116,000. Counter-protest demon- 
strations occurred at the  same  time  and  later.126 
It appeared that the movement was student-led and/or  was 
spontaneous. Some, however,  said DPP supporters were behind  the 
movement  from   its  onset.   In  any  case,  DPP   leaders   lined   up 
strongly  behind   the  movement and  gave  it  enthusiastic support. 
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KMT  leaders   were  thought to  oppose   the  movement; but  some 
opined  otherwise. There  were certainly  some KMT factions who 
opposed President Ma and  his administration that  liaised  with the 
protesters.127    Other  pan-blue  leaders   predicted  the   movement 
would create  a backlash  or in some way discredit  the  DPP. 
What  did  the  Sunflower  Movement accomplish?   And  did  it 
help DPP  candidates running  for office in November? It is perhaps 
more appropriate to first ask: What did it not accomplish?  The 
movement did not stop the Cross-Strait Service Trade  Agreement, 
as was its stated  central  purpose. It was speculated that  the protest 
might  result  in President Ma losing the  chairmanship of the  KMT 
and WANG Jin-pyng  assuming  that  position.  That  did not happen. 
It was said it might fracture the KMT such that  it would not have a 
common  platform going forward.  That was not a product of the 
movement. Some hoped  the movement would become  a permanent 
fixture  of Taiwan’s politics.  That  was not  to be; the movement fiz- 
zled (as  it is has  usually  happened with  most  large  movements in 
Taiwan).128 
Yet in some ways the movement was a success. It increased the 
voices  of young  people  and  students in the  political  processes.  It 
drew public attention to several issues, including the one it intended 
to influence.  It hurt  President Ma’s image.  It focused  attention on 
and interest in the coming election.  It spawned  other  grassroots, 
democratic movements.129 
In its wake, both  sides claimed  an advantage. DPP  leaders  ar- 
gued it was a powerful  grassroots movement that awakened citizens 
to the fact that Taiwan’s democracy was under  siege. Some DPP 
officials asserted it would  force  Beijing  to come  to terms  with the 
DPP. However, the DPP had put formulating its China policy in 
abeyance until after  the election  and didn’t belabor this point. Also 
Beijing refuted the DPP’s claim that it had to negotiate. In fact, 
President Xi reiterated China’s  “one  country,  two systems”  policy 
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(used to incorporate Hong Kong) would apply to Taiwan. However, 
Beijing  also  talked   about   the  “peaceful development”  of  cross- 
Strait  relations. The  KMT  and  Ma cited  progress  in relations with 
Beijing, while admitting there  had been some “interruptions.” Pres- 
ident Ma pointedly mentioned South Korea’s successful commercial 
negotiations (including  a free trade  agreement) with China  and the 
prospects of Taiwan  losing out  to one of its competitors.130 
After  the Sunflower  Movement ended,  though  certainly  having 
left its mark, other  (democratic or otherwise) protest movements 
sprang up in its place. One that had been festering,  and was delayed 
because  of the Sunflower  Movement, was the Anti-Nuclear Move- 
ment.  Sizeable  protests were  held  during  2011 and  2012, but,  as 
noted  above,  the  matter became  an election  issue in 2012 and  the 
KMT,  which  supported nuclear   power,   won  on  the  issue.  That 
changed  in mid-2014.  The  center  of attention became  the  Fourth 
Nuclear  Power Plant under  construction in Gongliao  near Taipei.131 
In fact, the anti-nuclear movement took  on a new life when in 
April  former  DPP  chairman LIN  Yi-hsiung  staged  a hunger  strike 
to block further work on the plant.  Public protest followed, includ- 
ing street  demonstrations that brought out thousands of citizens. 
Whereupon President Ma announced that  work on the plant  would 
be halted.  Taipower officials interjected that  not building  the plant 
meant  bankruptcy, but this plea seemed  to fall on deaf ears. Protes- 
tors were happy with the decision to stop work on the plant; though 
they were not satisfied  with merely  halting  it as opposed to cancel- 
ling the  plant’s  construction and  ending  Taiwan’s  reliance  on  nu- 
clear  power.132 
The  next  public  protest in Taiwan  involved  vicarious  support 
for the protest demonstrations in Hong Kong that seemed  to mimic 
the  Sunflower  Movement. Hong  Kong  students were  reacting  to a 
bad  economy,  fewer  job opportunities, and  displeasure that  China 
was  reneging   on  promised   freedoms.  Specifically,  they  charged 
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Beijing  with  backtracking on  pledges  made  in  1997 when  Hong 
Kong became  part  of China.133 
The movement, known  as the Occupy  Central (recall  the Sun- 
flower Movement had occupied  the legislature in Taiwan)  or the 
Umbrella movement (umbrellas being used to keep  the protest go- 
ing during the rain and also to shield students against police teargas, 
which reminded some of the students’  confrontations with police in 
Taiwan),  gained steam in September. Through October it appeared 
the Hong  Kong protest energized to the opposition in Taiwan  and 
might  affect  the  November election  in a way to help  the  DPP.134 
But there  were reasons  to think otherwise. Hong Kong is popu- 
lated  by a different ethnic  group  of Chinese  that  is not particularly 
popular in Taiwan. Hong  Kong is not a democracy and makes little 
pretense to be; it is part  of the  People’s  Republic of China.  Presi- 
dent  Ma  was  born  in  Hong  Kong  (something voters  in  Taiwan 
know) and he became  open in his criticism of China and his support 
for  the  movement in Hong  Kong.  Ma  even  suggested  that  China 
should  make  Hong  Kong a democratic region  separate from China 
and experiment with political  reform  there  as it did with capitalism 
when  it set up  special  economic  zones  in the  1980s.135   But,  Presi- 
dent  Ma also made  a distinction  between the Umbrella Movement 
(which was seeking  democracy) and the Sunflower  Movement that 
was attempting to influence  policy (since Taiwan  was already  a de- 
mocracy),  and  so in a sense belittled the  latter.136 
In any case, the leaders  of the movement decelerated activities 
in late October amid tension  and confusion  about  how (and why) to 
sustain  the  movement.137  Regarding Taiwan’s linkage  to the Hong 
Kong protest it appeared that President Ma had defused  the protest 
in Taiwan  in support of Hong  Kong by adopting a hostile  mien to- 
ward Beijing (although Chinese  leaders  probably understood this 
would help the KMT in the election  and also it was not very mean- 
ingful  and  certainly  not  permanent). The  DPP  moved  toward   a 
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more  accommodating policy toward  China  notwithstanding its sup- 
port  of the  protest and  its continued advocacy  of Taiwan’s  sover- 
eignty (while not talking  about  independence very much).138  Thus, 
there  seemed  to be a convergence between the  two camps  in Tai- 
wan, which ostensibly  reflected the  desire  of both  to move  toward 
the  center  to win more  votes as is typical  in democratic elections. 
 
 
C.   Gas Explosion  in Kaohsiung and Bad Cooking Oil Incidents 
 
At  this  time  there  were  two  separate events  that  looked  to 
have an impact  on the election.  One  was a gas explosion  in Kaohsi- 
ung. The other was a scandal that broke over bad cooking oil that 
contaminated the food chain in Taiwan. 
At the end of July a gas pipeline  exploded in the city of Kaoh- 
siung  that  killed  twenty-five   and  injured  two  hundred and  fifty- 
seven  according  to  the  first report on  the  incident.  It  also caused 
considerable physical  damage  to  the  streets  and  buildings  in  the 
city.139   Clearly,  someone was  at  fault.  After   a  round   of  casting 
blame,  responsibility settled  on “permissive development” that  al- 
lowed  gas lines  and  housing  tracts  on  the  same  streets.140   Mayor 
CHEN Chu  was  subpoenaed over  the  incident  and  was  called  a 
“culprit” by her  opponent in the  November election  contest.141 It 
appeared that  her image was hurt  and her reelection chances  possi- 
bly diminished. 
In September, a serious scandal hit when it was discovered that 
cooking  oil in Taiwan  had  been  tainted by recycled  waste  oil and 
animal  feed  oil, which  affected  more  than  a thousand businesses 
and  citizens.  Accusations were  first leveled  against  the  companies 
involved. But there followed finger pointing at local governments, 
especially  in Kaohsiung where  a major  company  involved  was lo- 
 
 
138. At this same time President Ma noted  that  the number of students from China 
studying  in Taiwan  had  increased from  800 to 25,000 during  his presidency while the 
number of  Chinese  tourists  had  reached three  million  a  year.  Also,  Ma  had  signed 
twenty-one agreements with China  during  that  period.  See Benjamin Carlson,  “Exclu- 
sive: Taiwan  president seeks closer China  ties,” Global  Post, November 3, 2014 (online 
at globalpost.com). 
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cated,  but  also the  central  government as the  regulator.142  As the 
case  unfolded, blame  was cast  more  on  big business  and  the  na- 
tional  government. Clearly  the  administration and  the  KMT  were 
hurt  by  the  public  outrage generated by  the  problem, which  re- 
mained  headline news for weeks.143 
By early  fall, Taiwan’s  economy  was looking  much  better. Its 
GDP  growth  was up  and  was projected to  be  3.7 percent for  the 
year, higher  than  the other  three  small dragons.144 There  was more 
good news: The Directorate General of the Budget  announced Tai- 
wan’s GDP  in the third  quarter had increased by 3.78 percent. The 
higher  than  expected growth  was attributed to a stronger showing 
in Taiwan’s  exports  of electronics and  machinery.145  The  positive 
news,  however,  was offset  by concern  over  consumer confidence, 
which  was  hit  by  worries  about  tax  increases.146   Also  exports  to 
China   were  down,  manufacturing  in  general   was  stagnant, and 
youth  employment was still a problem.147 
As Election Day drew closer, there  was more good news on the 
economy.  In  early  November, the  Ministry  of Transportation re- 
ported a 2.9 percent increase  in passenger traffic on the railroads,  a 
52.4 percent rise in port  traffic,  and  a 10.3 percent increase  in air- 
port  passengers (reaching the  highest  level of growth  in seventeen 
years).  Tourism  was up,  reaching  7.25 million  visits – a  reported 
increase  of 26.7 percent, which was the world’s highest.148  Taiwan’s 
export  processing  zones recorded a 12.36 percent gain from a year 
earlier.149 The World  Bank  ranked Taiwan  number nineteen in the 
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world  for doing  business,  up 1.1 points  from  a year  earlier.150 
Better times  were  also anticipated for 2015. Most  economists 
forecast  Taiwan’s economy  would do at least somewhat better. This 
was based  mainly on better prospects for the information and com- 
munications technology industries, financial  services,  and  tourism. 
It  was  predicted inflation   would  remain   low  and  unemployment 
would decline (though most new employment was expected to be in 
low paying  jobs and  there  was a mismatch  between new jobs and 
job seekers  preferences).151 
While  the  economy  was moving  in an  upward  trajectory and 
justified some, or even considerable, optimism,  it was uncertain if it 
would have much influence on voters. It may have come too late. 
Generally, the  public protest movements, scandals,  President Ma’s 
low poll ratings, and the political mood in Taiwan leading up to the 
election  seemed  to give the  KMT  (as the  party  in power)  a disad- 
vantage  and  an  advantage to  the  DPP  candidates. But  conditions 
also contributed to cynicism about  politics in Taiwan  and to a lack 
of confidence in both  political  parties.152 
The DPP  generally  managed during  the run-up  to the election 
to avoid the “CHEN Shui-bian  matter.” The party  and its top can- 
didates  did not make Chen an issue during the campaign.  They gen- 
erally eschewed  even mentioning him. In late October, the Taiwan 
Democratic Human Rights  Platform organized a march  on behalf 
of the former  president but it attracted only just over one hundred 
participants. They  stopped at  DPP  Headquarters to  ask  that  the 
party  honor   its  pledge  to  fight  for  Chen’s  medical  release   from 
prison.  But  no top  DPP  official responded. It was evident  that  the 
party  did not  want  to hear  or talk  about  Chen.153 
America, as usual, played  a role in the campaign.  Its influence 
factored in on the side of the KMT. Former officials that  played  a 
role in making  or carrying  out  Taiwan  policy lauded  President Ma 
for the last six years in terms  of tamping  down tensions  with China 
and reducing  the flashpoint level in the Taiwan  Strait.  The Obama 
administration, notwithstanding its Asia pivot to balance  the rise of 
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China,  did not continue to push this policy with any e´ lan and made 
no  mention of  Taiwan’s  role  in  it.  President Obama was  visibly 
quiet about  democracy or human  rights in carrying out his Asia pol- 
icy and  did not  applaud Taiwan’s Sunflower  Movement or the  op- 
position’s  pitch  that  it sought  to support Taiwan’s  democracy and 
sovereignty.154 
On the other  hand,  the mid-term  election  in the United States 
on November 4 installed  more  Republicans, who are  friendlier to 
Taiwan than Democrats, in Congress.  The Democrats big setback  in 
the election  was seen by some observers to offer a poignant lesson 
to  Taiwan:  that  dissatisfaction with  top  leaders  and  their  policies 
would   influence    voting   in   a   local   election    in   favor   of   the 
opposition.155 
 
V. THE CANDIDATES AND  THE CAMPAIGN 
 
In the months before the election, the parties selected their 
candidates. Others  joined  the  race  without   party  endorsements. 
Those  running  for mayors  of the metropolitan cities were the most 
visible. On the top of the list was Taipei  Metro.  Sean Lien was the 
KMT’s candidate for Taipei  mayor.  KO Wen-je  ran as an indepen- 
dent,  but  was supported by the  DPP  and  the  TSU.  (The  DPP  did 
not have a candidate in the race, having decided  in June that its 
candidates did not have as good a chance  of winning as Ko, whom 
they regarded as pro-DPP.)156 Eric Chu was the KMT candidate for 
mayor of New Taipei; YU Shyi-kun  was the DPP’s candidate. John 
Wu  was  the  ruling  party’s  choice  to  run  for  mayor  of  Taoyuan; 
CHENG Wen-tsan stood  for  the  DPP.  Jason  Hu  was the  KMT’s 
standard-bearer for mayor of Taichung;  LIN Chia-lung  represented 
the  DPP.   HUANG  Hsiu-shuang was  the  KMT’s  candidate  for 
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mayor of Tainan; William Lai stood for the DPP. YANG Chiu-hsing 
had  the  KMT’s nomination for  mayor  of Kaohsiung;  CHEN Chu 
was  the  DPP’s  candidate. Eric  Chu,  Jason  Hu,  William  Lai  and 
CHEN Chu  were  incumbents. 
The two main  parties  nominated candidates for the provincial 
city mayoral  contests  and  most  of the  county  magisterial jobs. But 
there  were also other  candidates. The other  parties  nominated con- 
testants for  provincial   councils,  municipal  mayors,  district  chiefs 
and  township   chiefs.  There   were  independents as  well  in  these 
races. 
Sean  Lien,  LIEN  Sheng-wen  in Chinese,  was born  in 1970 in 
the  United States.  He  received  his bachelor’s  degree  from  Fu Jen 
Catholic  University  in Taiwan  and  a J.D.  Degree from  Columbia 
University  Law School in the U.S. At age forty-four he was consid- 
ered  young  for  high  office.  However, he  was already  well known 
before  entering the race, being from a famous family and the son of 
LIEN  Chan,  a former  vice president and  presidential candidate in 
2000  and  2004.157   Sean  Lien  had  also  been  chairman of  Taipei 
Smart Card Corporation and EasyCard Corporation. Further giving 
him notoriety, in 2010 during  the  most  recent  off-year  election,  he 
was shot in the head  by an assailant  while campaigning for CHEN 
Hung-yuan, a candidate for City Council  in New Taipei  City.158 
KO  Wen-je  was born  in Hsinchu  City in Taiwan  in 1959. He 
studied  medicine  in both  Taiwan  and  the  United States  where  he 
specialized  in  surgery  and  critical  care.  Dr.  Ko  was a  pioneer in 
bringing  transplant surgery  to Taiwan  and was a well-known  advo- 
cate  for  better medicine.  He  gained  instant  fame  in 2006 when  it 
was reported that  he saved the life of Taichung  Mayor  Jason  Hu’s 
wife who  was very  seriously  injured  in an  auto  accident.  He  also 
directed the emergency team  that  attended Sean Lien after  he was 
shot. Finally, he organized support from the medical community for 
CHEN Shui-bian  when  Chen  ran  for mayor  of Taipei  in 1994 and 
president in 2000.159 
 
 
157. The Lien family is an old and famous  one in Taiwan.  Lien Chan’s grandfather, 
Lien Heng,  was a leading  intellectual and wrote  the book  A General History  of of Tai- 
wan, that was published in 1920 and was the first detailed history of Taiwan at the time. 
The family became  wealthy  and has remained so. Lien  Chan  was the youngest  person 
ever  to serve  in Taiwan’s  cabinet,  serving  in several  offices during  his career.  He  was 
also governor of Taiwan  Province,  premier and chairman of the KMT before  he twice 
ran  for president. 
158. For details  see Copper, Taiwan’s 2010 Metropolitan City Elections,  p. 48. 
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Eric  Chu,  CHU   Li-lun,  was  born  in  Bade  City  in  Taoyuan 
County  in Taiwan in 1961. He graduated from National Taiwan 
University  and then went to the U.S. for further study, receiving  an 
M.A.  and a PhD  degree  in accounting from New York  University. 
He taught  at New York University  for a short time before  returning 
to Taiwan, where he joined the faculty of his alma mater. He was 
promoted to full professor at the young age of thirty-six. From 1999 
to 2001, he served  as a KMT legislator.  In 2001, he ran successfully 
for the position  of Taoyuan magistrate; he was reelected in 2005. In 
2009, President Ma appointed him deputy  premier; he was the 
youngest  person  ever at age forty-eight, to take  that  position.160 In 
2010, he resigned  to run for mayor of New Taipei and defeated DPP 
chairwoman TSAI Ing-wen in that election.  He soon became  a pop- 
ular figure in Taiwan.161 
YU Shyi-kun was born in Taihe village in Yilan County  in Tai- 
wan in 1948 of a poor  rural  family. As a youth  he worked  on the 
family  farm  and  attended school  part  time.  He  graduated  from 
Tunghai  University  at the  age of thirty-seven. Meanwhile, Yu was 
elected  to the  Taiwan  Provincial  Assembly  and  in 1986 became  a 
founding  member of the  DPP  – later  rising to membership on the 
party’s Central Committee and its Central Standing  Committee. He 
was elected  magistrate of Yilan County  in 1990. In 2000, President 
Chen  appointed him Vice Premier. In 2002, he was elevated to the 
job  of premier, which  he  held  until  2004. In  2006, he  was chosen 
chairman of the  DPP.162  In 2007, the  Supreme Prosecutor’s Office 
indicted  Yu  on  charges  of corruption; he resigned  as chairman of 
the party  the same  day. However, he was later  found  not  guilty of 
the  charges.163 
John  Wu, WU Chih-yang,  was born  in Taiwan  in 1969, the son 
of WU  Po-hsiung,  one  of Taiwan’s  leading  political  figures.164 He 
received  Master   degrees  in law from  National Taiwan  University 
and  from  Harvard University   in  the  U.S.  He  was  also  a  visiting 
scholar  at Harvard. He returned to Taiwan  where  he practiced law 
for several  years  before  becoming  a national legislator.  He  served 
 
 
160. Republic  of China Yearbook 2012, p. 384. 
161. See Copper, Taiwan’s 2010 Metropolitan City Elections,  p. 49. 
162. See  John  F.  Copper, Historical  Dictioinary   of  Taiwan   (Republic  of  China) 
fourth  edition  (Lanham, MD:  Rowman Littlefiend, 2015), p. 315. 
163. Rich Chang, “Former officials found not guilty,” Taipei Times, July 3, 2012 (on- 
line at taipeitimes.com). 
164. Wu Po-hsiung  served  as mayor  of Taipei,  minister  of state,  minister  of interior, 
secretary-general of the  Office  of the  President, and  Secretary General of the  KMT. 
 
 
 
 
42 CONTEMPORARY  ASIAN STUDIES  SERIES 
 
 
in that  position  from 2005 to 2009 before  he was elected  the mayor 
of Taoyuan.165 
CHENG Wen-tsan was born  in Taiwan  in 1967. He received  a 
B.A.  degree   in  sociology  from  National Taiwan  University   and 
studied  at the university’s  Graduate Institute of National Develop- 
ment.  Upon  entering politics,  he  was appointed a member of the 
DPP’s  Department of Culture and  Administration and  served  on 
the  Taoyuan County  Council.  During  the  Chen  administration, he 
was head  of the  Government Information Office  at which time  he 
became  a known  political  figure.  In 2010, Cheng  ran  for Taoyuan 
magistrate; he  lost  by only  49,000 votes  even  though  he  had  only 
two months  to prepare for the  election.166 
Jason  Hu (HU  Chih-chiang) was born  in Beijing. A year later 
his  family  moved  to  Taichung  where  he  grew  up.  He  graduated 
from National Chengchi  University  after  which he went abroad for 
graduate study.  He  received  his PhD  degree  in international rela- 
tions from Oxford  in the U.K. in 1984. He returned to Taiwan  and 
taught  at Sun Yat-sen  University. Later,  he was appointed director 
of the Government Information Office. In 1996, he was chosen Tai- 
wan’s diplomatic  representative to the U.S. In 1997, he rose to be- 
come  foreign  minister,  and  then  was director of the  Cultural and 
Communications Affairs  Committee of the  KMT.  In 2001, he was 
elected  mayor  of Taichung.167 
LIN Chia-lung  was born  in Taipei in February 1964. He gradu- 
ated  from National Taiwan  University  and then  went to Yale Uni- 
versity  in  the  United States  where  he  received  a  PhD  degree  in 
political science. He returned to Taiwan and taught  at National 
Chengchi  University. He specialized  in the democratization of Tai- 
wan and the political and economic  development of China, publish- 
ing several works on these subjects. In 2000, President CHEN Shui- 
bian  appointed him  advisor  to  the  National Security  Council  and 
cabinet  spokesman in 2003. In 2004, he became  director of the Gov- 
ernment Information Office. In 2005, he ran for mayor of Taichung 
but lost to Jason  Hu. In 2006, he was appointed Secretary-General 
of   the   DPP    and   in   2007,   deputy    secretary  general    to   the 
president.168 
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William Lai (LAI  Ching-te) was born  in Taipei  County  in Oc- 
tober  1959. He studied  at National Cheng  Kung University  in Tai- 
nan  and  National Taiwan  University   in  Taipei.  Subsequently, he 
went to Harvard University  and received  an M.A. degree  in public 
health.  He  returned to Taiwan  and  in 1996 won a seat  in the  Na- 
tional  Assembly.  In 1998, he ran for the Legislative  Yuan  and won. 
He  was reelected three  times  and  was chosen  four  times  Taiwan’s 
best  legislator  by NGO  Citizens  Congress  Watch.  In 2010, he was 
elected  mayor  of Tainan  metropolis.169 
HUANG  Hsiu-shuang was  born  in  Taiwan  in  1961. She  re- 
ceived an M.A. degree  from Chengchi  University  and a PhD degree 
in  psychology  from  Liverpool  University   in  the  U.K.  After   re- 
turning  to Taiwan,  she was hired  as a professor at National Tainan 
University  where  she later  became  an academic  dean  and  then  in 
2007, president of the university.  In the meantime she was a scholar 
in residence at the University  of California, Berkeley and Yale Uni- 
versity.  She  has  authored and  co-authored a number of academic 
articles.170 
CHEN Chu was born in Yilan County  in Taiwan in 1950. After 
Shih Hsin School of Journalism, she attended National Sun Yet-sen 
University  in Kaohsiung. In 1979, she was involved  in planning  the 
Kaohsiung  Incident,  an   opposition-led protest  movement that 
turned violent, and was one of the “Kaohsiung eight” that was pros- 
ecuted  the  next  year.  She served  six years  in prison.  After  her  re- 
lease,  she  became  director of the  Taiwan  Association of Human 
Rights  and  served  as their  chairwoman from  1992 to  1994. When 
CHEN Shui-bian  was elected  mayor of Taipei in 1994, he appointed 
her  head  of the  city’s Bureau of Social Affairs.  Later,  when Frank 
Hsieh  was elected  mayor  of Kaohsiung, he appointed CHEN Chu 
head  of the city’s Bureau of Social Affairs.  When  CHEN Shui-bian 
was president, he appointed her  Minister  of the  Council  on Labor 
Affairs.  In 2006, she was elected  mayor  of Kaohsiung;  she was re- 
elected  in 2010.171 
YANG Chiu-hsing  was born in Taiwan in 1956. He received  his 
B.S. and M.S. degrees  in civil engineering at National Taiwan  Uni- 
versity. He was employed as an engineer and also public works and 
civic planning.  He represented the DPP as a member of the Legisla- 
tive Yuan from 1999 to 2001. He subsequently became  a member of 
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the  party’s  Central Standing  Committee. He  was a  magistrate in 
Kaohsiung County  from  2001 to 2010.172 
In 2010, Yang sought  the  DPP’s nomination to run  for mayor 
of Kaohsiung metropolis. Failing to get it, he decided  he would run 
anyway. TSAI  Ing-wen  expressed concern  that  this would split the 
DPP  vote and tried  to persuade him to withdraw,  so instead  James 
Soong endorsed Yang. The polls, however,  showed that CHEN Chu 
would win easily and concern about the “Yang challenge”  faded. 
Afterwards, Yang switched  parties  and joined  the KMT.173 
The  campaign  went  into  high  gear  at  the  end  of September, 
two months  ahead  of voting day. It was clear at that  time that  two 
of   the   metropolitan  city   mayoral   races,   those   in   Taipei   and 
Taichung,  would be the most competitive, the most interesting, and 
the most telling in terms of defining the election  as a KMT or DPP 
victory. If the KMT should  lose in Taipei,  it would be considered a 
serious setback  in a KMT stronghold. If it should lose the Taichung 
race,  it would  signal that  the  DPP  had  conquered central  Taiwan, 
giving it control  of both the central  and southern parts of the island. 
 
A.  Taipei Mayor Race: Sean Lien v. KO Wen-je 
 
In  running  for  mayor  of  Taipei,  Sean  Lien  realized  that  he 
would gain little  or nothing  from associating  with the Ma adminis- 
tration and may have even calculated that  it would help to dissoci- 
ate from Ma. Anyway,  shortly  after  he announced his candidacy  in 
February, Lien criticized the Ma administration for its bad perform- 
ance  in managing  the  economy.  He  also  focused  on  youth  issues 
and kept in touch with student protesters during the Sunflower 
Movement and won the backing  from many of them—which again 
separated him from Ma. Lien later  chided  President Ma for his at- 
tempts  to oust WANG Jin-pyng from the party. Lien’s campaign 
strategy  had  resonance and  early  on  he  led  in the  opinion  polls, 
though  he obviously  had the advantage due to the DPP’s difficulty 
in choosing a candidate, or in this case, deciding to support an inde- 
pendent and  not  fielding  a contender.174 
As  the  campaign  proceeded, Ko’s supporters used  the  Lien’s 
family wealth  and social status  to portray Sean Lien as the scion of 
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a rich family and distant  from ordinary people  as in he was uncar- 
ing, arrogant, etc. Ko’s campaign  also sought  to link Lien to Presi- 
dent Ma in order  to use Ma’s unpopularity and the public’s distrust 
of Ma and  his administration against  Lien.  This in fact, became  a 
central  theme  of Ko’s election  strategy.  In addition, Ko condemned 
partisan politics and endeavored to appeal  broadly  to the electorate 
to prevent it from dividing along party lines (which would be an 
advantage to  Lien).175  Finally,  Ko  portrayed himself  as a profes- 
sional person with no ties to business. He avoided the topic of 
independence.176 
The  Lien  camp  responded by citing  legal  charges  against  Ko 
for  overseeing an  organ  transplant from  a  person  with  AIDS  in 
2001 – he was punished by the National Taiwan  University  and the 
Ministry of Health, while the Control Yuan accused  him of miscon- 
duct. The Lien  campaign  also said Ko profited from selling organs 
harvested in China from Falun Gung members that were executed – 
Ko denied  these  charges.  In addition, the  KMT  took  note  of Ko’s 
support for former  president CHEN Shui-bian  (which Ko publically 
confirmed), and  his differences with TSAI  Ing-wen  over  the  “Tai- 
wan Consensus.”177 
Ko’s  campaign   platform had  considerable resonance  and  in 
mid-October, according  to a poll conducted by the pro-pan blue 
Chinese  language  paper,  the United Daily News, Ko would win the 
election   handily.  Ko  had  a  thirteen point  lead,  the  paper   said, 
mainly because  of the perception Lien had “gotten everything  on a 
silver platter”, and the public discontent with the KMT and the Ma 
administration. The  paper   reported Ko  had  very  strong  support 
among  pan-green voters  and  a thirty-one percent edge  among  in- 
dependents; Lien  had  weaker  than  expected support even  among 
pan-blue voters.178 
However, two weeks later,  according  to the KMT, the gap had 
narrowed. The  odds-makers (gamblers), in fact,  predicted a Lien 
win (though this was subsequently changed  to a draw or close elec- 
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tion).179  The difference in the predictions was, in part,  due the fact 
that  an  estimated one  hundred thousand Taiwan  business  people 
and  their  families  in the  constituency resided  in China,  and  were 
mainly  pro-blue (by a seventy  percent or more  margin)  and  were 
not  counted;  they  would  presumably return to vote.180  Some  pun- 
dits also predicted that many undecided voters would go for Lien in 
the  last  few days  of the  campaign  because  of their  loyalty  to  the 
KMT  and  the  view that  Ko  is a  “lose  cannon.”181   On  the  other 
hand,  due  to  discontent with  politics  in Taiwan,  by one  estimate 
only  half  the  number of voters  residing  in China  that  returned in 
2012 would come  back  to vote.182 
On November 7, the two candidates faced off in a two-hour 
televised  debate. Ko characterized himself  as a candidate that  can 
“reset” Taiwan  politics  by ending  partisanship and  advancing  fair- 
ness and  justice.  He  described what  Taipei  would  become  if Lien 
were  elected:   a  “monopolistic financial  holding  company.” Lien 
said his victory would be followed by a “great leap forward in de- 
velopment” and Ko’s, if he won, a “massive disaster.”  Furthermore, 
he said Taipei would become  a “laboratory of new medicines” if Ko 
were  elected  mayor.183  By most accounts,  Ko won the debate.184 
Subsequently, Ko, in an appeal  to independent voters,  pledged 
not  to join a political  party  and  declared his senior  officials would 
not  participate in political  activities.  Lien  charged  that  Ko shifted 
his positions  on issues, while noting that Ko had once been an advo- 
cate of Taiwan’s independence. He also linked  Ko to CHEN Shui- 
bian based  on his “deep  green”  affiliations,  and Ko’s call for Chen 
to be released from  prison.  Ko retorted that  Lien  and  Chen  alike 
were  his patients. Lien  said that  he would demand all city govern- 
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ment  officials to abide  by strict rules of ethics and would not allow 
them  to entertain anyone  from  businesses  involved  in public  con- 
tracting.  Both  candidates said  they  opposed extending the  life of 
the two nuclear  power  plants  in Taipei  City.185 
In early November, a controversy broke  out which potentially 
might  have  a profound impact  on the  election  given the  milieu  of 
public concern about  government spying. The Ko campaign  director 
reported that  he had found  their  offices to be wiretapped. He  sus- 
pected  the Lien camp and immediately called the police. The police 
found what the media called a “mouse tail.” Prima facie evidence 
suggested that Lien’s people did the deed.186 Soon, however, inves- 
tigators  said  that  the  Ko  campaign  organization had  planted the 
wire  in order  to  implicate  the  Lien  camp.  Alex  Tsai,  Lien’s  cam- 
paign manager, sued. On the other  hand,  further police work found 
the detectives hired by the Ko team to commit the deed. Ko person- 
ally was not  found  involved  and  continued to  lead  in the  opinion 
polls by a significant  margin.187 
Going  into the final stretch  of the campaign,  LIEN  Chan  used 
foul  language,  which  publically  excoriated KO  Wen-je.  Lien  said 
Ko’s family had collaborated with the Japanese during  the colonial 
period  (1895-1945),  noting  specifically  that  Ko’s  grandfather had 
taken  a Japanese name. There  was a backlash  and LIEN  Chan sub- 
sequently apologized.188 
Toward  the end of the campaign  period  it appeared Ko main- 
tained  his momentum. The weekend before  Election Day, his cam- 
paign  organized a  parade that  reportedly got  a  turnout of  two 
hundred thousand (including  many who joined along the way). The 
turnout created a mood  that  was festive  and  where  idealism  and 
inclusiveness  seemed  the ideas of the day. Ko’s campaign  color was 
white representing idealism and acceptance (as opposed to divisive- 
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ness).189     Lien’s   campaign    in   a   number   of   respects    seemed 
desperate.190 
Just two days before  the voting, it was reported that KMT offi- 
cials had notified their legislators that if Lien did not win the vote in 
their  constituencies the party  might not  re-nominate them  in 2016, 
reflecting  a lack of party  support for Lien  or perceiving  he would 
otherwise lose the election.  The KMT denied  the accusation.191 The 
opposition in the meantime charged  that  the government was mak- 
ing financial  decisions  to help KMT candidates, such as raising bo- 
nuses  for  government  employees, increasing  pensions,  and 
controlling the  price  of oil and  other  commodities.192 
 
B. Taichung Mayor Race: Jason Hu v. LIN Chia-Lung 
 
Jason  Hu appeared to hurt  his campaign  early on by saying he 
was not running  again. This evoked  reports that  he was tired  of be- 
ing mayor.  There  were  also questions about  his health,  stemming 
from a stroke  and coronary bypass surgery  earlier  and concern  that 
his popularity had declined  in recent  years.193 This was offset, some 
observers said, by the fact that  the Hu-Lin  race was a repeat of the 
2005 election  when Hu won easily, by almost ninety thousand votes, 
and  that  Hu  could  repeat the  performance.194 
In late September, President Ma travelled to Taichung  and ap- 
peared at Mayor  Jason  Hu’s campaign  headquarters to bolster  his 
campaign.  He  lauded  Mayor  Hu  for transforming the  cultural  and 
social landscape of the  city. At  the  same  time,  DPP  Chairwoman 
Tsai embarked on a tour  of central  Taiwan, which she said was key 
to  winning  the  election.  The  occasion  was the  anniversary of the 
party’s founding.  She spoke of consolidating democracy, driving ec- 
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onomic  development, and institutionalizing a mechanism for cross- 
strait  exchanges.”195 
On October 24, Hu and Lin engaged  in a public debate. Lin, at 
the time, enjoyed  a large lead in the polls: Lin was favored  by forty- 
eight  percent of voters  whereas  Hu  was favored  by only  twenty- 
four; twenty-six percent of voters were undecided.196 Hu performed 
well in the debate, but it also seemed  he had the advantage since he 
had held the office for thirteen years.  He spoke  of his accomplish- 
ments   as  mayor   and   about   his  vision  of  continuing   to   make 
Taichung  a world-class city. Lin downplayed Hu’s accomplishments, 
and touted better public transportation, social welfare, and a down- 
town  renewal.197  It  was  uncertain at  the  time  whether Hu  could 
close the  favorability gap. 
Just a few days before the election,  Central Taiwan’s first opera 
house  opened in  Taichung.  Minister   of  Culture  LUNG  Ying-tai 
called it the “pride  of Taichung”  and praised  Mayor  Hu for the ac- 
complishment. President Ma attended the opening  ceremony of the 
2,014 seat architecturally eye-catching building.198  This was offered 
as evidence  to  refute  Lin’s charge  that  Hu  had  not  accomplished 
what  he  had  planned in terms  of helping  the  city. Lin  countered 
with claims that  Hu  was making  the  opera  house  appear as a per- 
sonal  project,  that  the  timing  of the  opening  date  was suspicious, 
that  city money  was spent  on advertising it just before  the election, 
and  that  the  project   experienced  many  problems   during 
construction.199 
During  the  very last days of the  campaign,  Terry  Gou,  chair- 
man  of the  Foxconn  Technology Group and  well-known  business- 
man in Taiwan, publically endorsed Hu. Gou praised  Hu’s strategic 
vision  and  his “block  development” plan  for  the  area.  TSAI  Ing- 
wen assailed  Gou  for “stepping over  the  line”  in the  endorsement 
and  said that  Lin had  the  support of a broad  based  of people.200 
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C. Predictions of Other Elections 
 
John  Wu, who became  well known  in Taiwan  for his work  as 
mayor of Taoyuan,  seemed to be a shoo-in based on his work in 
improving  Taiwan’s  major  international airport and  building  the 
rapid transit  system linking the airport with Taipei, and for advanc- 
ing the idea of making Taoyuan an intelligent city which meant  pro- 
moting economic  development, civic consciousness  and the 
environment.201   However, mid-year  2014, there  were  rumors  that 
the KMT would replace  Wu as its candidate for Taoyuan mayor 
because  of a corruption scandal involving his deputy.  The KMT, 
however,  denied  this.202 In the following months  the issue appeared 
to have  lost traction. 
Eric  Chu  appeared to  be  an  easy  winner  in the  New  Taipei 
election  contest.  He was popular and his campaign  was on track. 
Similarly, in the months  and weeks leading  up to Election Day, the 
campaigns  in Kaohsiung and Tainan  showed, by all of the evidence 
available,  not  to be close. CHEN Chu  and  William  Lai, both  DPP 
candidates and incumbents with good track records  in office and 
working in their party’s stronghold areas, were, according  to all cal- 
culations,  going to win easily. 
 
D.  How Different Factors May Have Influenced Voting 
 
The  Ma  administration and  KMT  officials  continued to  push 
on the issue of trade,  arguing that agreements initiated by President 
Ma, notably  the Trade  in Services deal and bilateral free trade 
agreements, were  vital  to  Taiwan’s  economy;   by  innuendo  they 
blamed  the  DPP  for blocking  the  agreements and  thus  hampering 
Taiwan’s economic  growth.203  The KMT likewise continued to talk 
up how critical trade  with China  was to Taiwan’s economy.204 DPP 
officials continued to play down the economic  importance of China 
to Taiwan,  the harm  from the commercial relations, and the threat 
to Taiwan’s democracy and sovereignty. 
These  issues  attracted more  media  attention during  the  Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting  in Beijing during the run-up 
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to the  election.  Former Vice President Vincent  Siew attended the 
meeting  and met with China’s President XI Jinping  and other  high 
officials. Taiwan’s  reliance  on trade  got attention. Coinciding  with 
the meeting,  China  reached a free trade  agreement with South  Ko- 
rea,  which drew  unwanted attention to Taiwan;  this resulted in re- 
strictions  on trade  and economic  losses on Taiwan.205 For all of this, 
DPP  candidates lost the argument and sacrificed  points  to impress 
the  electorate. 
Meanwhile,  the   issue  of  campaign   irregularities,  especially 
bribery  and vote buying, got playtime  in the media.  It was reported 
that  this  had  become  more  serious  and  was a threat to  Taiwan’s 
democracy. The  reported  number of  cases  and  people   involved 
came  from  the  Supreme Prosecutor’s Office.206  The  KMT  was im- 
plicated  more than the DPP because  it was the ruling party, more of 
its people  were in office, and because  it appeared the KMT was not 
doing as well as the DPP  in the campaign  and so was desperate.207 
In  the  last  days  of  the  campaign,  the  Ma  administration re- 
ceived  more  good  news  on  the  economy.  Real  monthly  earnings 
were up almost three  percent from a year earlier.208  Unemployment 
fell to  a seven-year low.209  These  were  areas  of most  concern  to 
citizens.  However, Ma’s  approval rating  did  not  go  up;  rather it 
went down—by two percentage points  the first ten days of Novem- 
ber according  to the Taiwan Mood Barometer.210  Thus, it appeared 
that  the positive  economic  news was too late to have much impact 
on voters’  views of the  Ma administration and  the  KMT. 
 
VI. THE ELECTION  RESULTS 
 
The election  results were pretty  much known by the evening of 
voting day. By almost  everyone’s  reckoning,  the DPP  had won and 
the KMT had lost. When the final tallies were made, it was clear the 
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election  outcome was much  better than  expected for the  DPP  and 
worse  than  anticipated for the  KMT  – the  DPP  had  won a major 
victory while the  KMT  had  suffered  an embarrassing drubbing. 
This was evident  from  what  the  two parties’  leaders  said and 
did.  Premier JIANG Yi-huah   took  responsibility for  the  KMT’s 
poor performance and announced his resignation the evening of the 
election. He stated that the results showed that the people were 
dissatisfied  with the  administration’s policies.211  Before  the  end  of 
the day, President Ma apologized for the poll results  and promised 
reform.  Prior  to Ma returning to party  headquarters, several  KMT 
officials gathered to demand Ma resign as chairman of the party.212 
The next day, eighty-one  members of the cabinet  stepped down, 
including  Vice Premier MAO  Chi-kuo,  Executive Yuan  Secretary 
General LEE  Si-chuan, and various ministers  and deputy  ministers; 
this left a serious vacuum in the Ma administration.213  President Ma 
subsequently promised  to resign as chairman of the KMT (and did), 
while  accepting  blame  for  the  KMT  election  defeat.214  Some,  in- 
cluding former  President LEE  Teng-hui,  said Ma should  step down 
from the presidency in order  to “revolutionize the government.”215 
The  DPP   leadership’s   happy   reaction  stood   in  contrast  to  the 
KMT’s.  Chairwoman TSAI  Ing-wen  cited  the  victory  her  party’s 
“best  performance” and  said it represented trust  in the  DPP.  She 
said she saw the  results  as a “mandate for her  party,”  though  she 
did not  say exactly what  that  meant.216 
The  numbers also proved  that  the  election  was a disaster  for 
the KMT and a huge victory for the DPP. Before  the election  as the 
ruling  party,  the  KMT  controlled fourteen of Taiwan’s twenty-two 
cities and  counties.  It held  three  of the  five metropolitan mayoral 
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jobs (and  Taoyuan), while in contrast the DPP  had only two. As a 
result  of this  election,  the  KMT  will rule  a total  of only  six city, 
county and municipal  governments. Only one metropolitan city will 
have a KMT mayor.217 In city council seats, the KMT failed to win a 
majority  in any  of the  municipalities; this  is a big drop  from  the 
number of seats  it held  before  the  election.218 
By political party, votes cast for mayors were as follows: the 
Democratic Progressive Party  received  47.6 percent of the  votes, 
the Kuomintang 40.7 percent. Other parties  received  but a tiny per- 
cent  of  the  votes.  However, Non-Party candidates received   11.7 
percent of the  vote.  In the  municipal  councilor  elections,  the  DPP 
won 37.1 percent of the  ballots  cast, while the  KMT  received  36.9 
percent.  Non-Party candidates garnered  20  percent of  the  vote. 
Votes for the other parties divided as follows: The Taiwan Solidarity 
Union  (1.9 percent); the  People  First  Party  (1.7 percent); and  the 
New Party  (1.1 percent). 
For  township  magistrates, the  KMT  won 33.7 percent and  the 
DPP  31.7 percent. Non-Party candidates won 34.2 percent. Among 
the other  parties,  none received  more than one percent of the votes. 
For township  representatives, the KMT got 22.6 percent of the vote, 
while the DPP  received  12.7 percent of the vote. Non-Party candi- 
dates won 35.6 percent. In the village chiefs’ election,  the KMT won 
23.8 percent of the vote in contrast to the DPP,  which received  6.6 
percent. Non-Party candidates got 69.4 percent.219 
Looking  at the metropolitan city mayoral  races separately is 
especially  instructive  in terms  of assessing  the  election’s  scorecard 
and the political sea change that will inevitably  result from the elec- 
tion. They provide  both individual  stories and together speak of the 
KMT’s travails  and  the  DPP’s  winning  strategies. 
 
A.    Taipei City Mayoral Election Results 
 
In the Taipei city race, KO Wen-je won with 853,983 votes 
compared to Lien’s 609,932, or by a whopping  244,051 vote margin. 
Ko  took  more  than  fifty-seven  percent of  the  vote  compared to 
Lien’s  less  than  forty-two   percent.220   This  split  is akin  to  HAU 
 
217. Loa  Lok-sin  and  Shih Hsiu-chuan, “KMT  trounced,” Taipei  Times,  November 
30, 2014 (online  at taipeitimes.com). 
218. “Opposition wins by landslide;  Jiang  resigns,”  China  Post November 30, 2014 
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Lung-bin’s victory in 2010, where he won 55.7 percent of the vote in 
comparison to SU Tseng-chang’s  43.8 percent. Hau  was not consid- 
ered  an  especially  good  campaigner and  ran  against  one  of  the 
DPP’s best—a  founding  member of the party  and former  premier, 
chairman of the DPP,  and vice presidential candidate in 2008. Hau 
had  won  with  even  bigger  margins  in the  previous  election.  MA 
Ying-jeou  won a twenty-eight point  victory  over  CHEN Shui-bian 
in 1998.221 That number indicates  Taipei’s importance as a KMT 
stronghold and  the  gravity of the  Lien  loss. 
Moreover, Ko had  little  experience in politics or business.  He 
was known  for making  gaffes in public.  He  had  no political  party, 
though  the DPP  supported him as its candidate. He won by besting 
the  DPP’s  candidates in a pre-campaign poll  and  then  convincing 
DPP  leaders  not to field a candidate. He won by making  an appeal 
to end politics as usual, while condemning Taiwan’s divisive politi- 
cal partisanship. He won by criticizing the KMT and President Ma, 
and  Lien  by  association. His  campaign   made  an  issue  of  Lien’s 
wealthy family and Sean Lien’s privileged status in life, which 
resonanated with the voters.  He appealed to undecided voters  and 
to disgruntled KMT  voters.  He  got the  support of Taiwan’s  youth 
and a multitude of voters who perceived something was wrong with 
politics in Taiwan. He used the Internet and other  social media 
effectively.222 
Lien  criticized  Ko  harshly  during  the  campaign,  but  this  was 
not very effective in the context  of citizen fatigue over partisanship, 
attack  ads, mean  politics,  and  most  voters  wanting  something new 
and better. Also, Ko handled the attacks  very well.223 The nastiness 
of the  campaign,  which was mainly  perceived as initiated by Lien, 
clearly  turned off many  potential voters.224 
But  mostly  it was President Ma and  the  KMT’s brand.  There 
was a widespread public  perception of a lack of leadership and  a 
feeling that Taiwan was not doing well mainly because of sub-par 
governance. This was more  apparent in Taipei,  it being the capital 
city, compared to other  places. It was made even more obvious  ow- 
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ing  to  Lien  and  his  campaign   criticizing  President  Ma  and  his 
policies. 
Ko was lucky in several ways. He probably would not have won 
as a DPP  candidate. If the  DPP  had  entered a party  candidate in 
the race (which would have divided  the anti-KMT vote),  he would 
not have been  victorious.  His lack of experience and family wealth 
were assets in the political  milieu of this campaign;  ordinarily, they 
would not  have been.  Also,  the various  protest movements helped 
him. 
In  any  case,  failing  in  the   Taipei   mayoral   election   was  a 
profound setback  for the  KMT.  It was a matter of losing a city of 
mostly pro-KMT voters. Taipei is the capital city and Taiwan’s larg- 
est city. It is the  location  of the  national government, the  parties’ 
offices, the best universities,  and the headquarters of most large 
companies. It is a trend  setting  city. Few thought the  KMT  would 
lose Taipei,  so the loss was indeed  a shock. 
Losing Taichung  metropolitan was also a huge setback  for the 
KMT.  Taichung   had  long  represented  central   Taiwan   and  was 
viewed as a “strategic battleground” between north  Taiwan  (which 
was a KMT  stronghold) and  south  Taiwan  (which  was DPP  terri- 
tory). It was said that whichever party won Taichung, tipped the 
“geopolitical balance” in its favor  and  thus  that  party  could  claim 
an overall  election  victory.225 
 
B. Taichung Mayoral Election Results 
 
Jason  Hu  lost the  election  by 209,753 votes,  which meant  his 
challenger had received  more  than  fifty-seven  percent of the votes 
cast. It was a stunning defeat for Hu. He said after the votes were 
counted:  “I am not good enough  and I didn’t work hard enough.”226 
But this explanation wasn’t complete and perhaps wasn’t plausible. 
Hu had won every election he stood for in Taichung. He had 
defeated his challenger, LIN Chia-lung,  in 2005 for the mayoral  job 
by a nearly  twenty  point  margin.  He was a superb  campaigner. He 
had garnered some sympathy  vote because  of the car accident  that 
he had been  in and his wife’s serious  injury in that  accident—dam- 
age to her  spleen  and  an arm  injury  that  required an amputation. 
 
225. This was often stated  during election  campaigns  in Taiwan and was even said to 
be an importnt part of the two parties’ strategies. This was certainly the case of the most 
recent  local elections.  See Copper, Taiwan’s 2010 Metropolitcan  City Elections,  p. 52. 
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By most accounts,  he had done a good job as mayor. In fact, he felt 
he  should  have  won  and  blamed  the  Ma  administration and  the 
KMT’s unpopular status  for  the  loss. Hu  noted  after  the  election 
that  the  election  was  a  “death sentence” for  Ma,  suggesting  the 
election  had gone bad for the KMT almost  everywhere because  of 
Ma’s poor  leadership.227 
But Lin also capitalized on the fact many citizens of Taichung 
felt  Hu  had  been  mayor  too  long.  Hu  reinforced this  perception 
when he said early on that  he did not want to run again. Some said 
that  President Ma  pressured him  to  run  and  he  could  not  refuse. 
While  this fact was unconfirmed, it shouldn’t  have  become  public 
knowledge. Lin cited many public projects  that  Hu had not under- 
taken  as well as some  that  Hu  had  started, but  that  Lin  said  he 
himself  had  proposed nearly  a  decade   earlier.   Specifically  men- 
tioned  was a metro  system.228  This had some resonance. 
Lin’s reputation, as a critic of China and an advocate of Beijing 
following  the  Taiwan  model  of  democracy and  it  improving   its 
human  rights record,  no doubt  gained  him acclaim and voter’s sup- 
port  in view of widespread perception that  the  KMT  and  the  Ma 
administration had seriously overreached in promoting ties with 
China.229 His ethnicity may have also helped  – Lin being Fukien 
Taiwanese  versus  Hu  who  was Mainland Chinese  (like  President 
Ma). 
 
 
C.   New Taipei Mayoral, Taoyuan Mayoral and Other Election 
Results 
 
Eric Chu defeated YU Shyi-kun  in the New Taipei  race  – but 
the  vote  was close. It probably would  not  have  been  so close if it 
wasn’t for the fact that  the KMT and the Ma Administration were 
unpopular, and  voters  were  angry  and  wanted  a change.  Chu  won 
by a vote  tally of 959,302 votes  compared to 934,774 for Yu. Chu 
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barely  won over  fifty percent of the  vote  versus  Yu, who received 
48.8 percent.230 
In  2010, Chu  had  received  1,115,536 votes  against  TSAI  Ing- 
wen of the  DPP,  who got 1,004,900. Chu  captured 52.6 percent of 
the  vote  compared to Tsai’s 47.4 percent. Chu  defeated the  DPP’s 
chairperson who  was popular and  a very  good  campaigner.231 He 
was a highly regarded mayor  and  was popular in office as well as 
during  the months  leading  up to this election.  There  was even seri- 
ous talk that  he would be the KMT’s presidential nominee in 2016. 
Finally,  New Taipei  was regarded as a KMT  stronghold. The  tight 
vote count  surprised many observers and varied  considerably from 
what  the  polls predicted.232  All of this suggests that  the  KMT  and 
the Ma administration were a drag on the candidates running  in this 
election.  And  this got worse  during  the  last days of the  campaign. 
If the  vote  tally for Eric  Chu  was not  anticipated, it was even 
more  so for John  Wu. CHENG Wen-tsan defeated Wu by around 
50,000 votes even though  the polls indicated Wu would win by 
something between nine  and  twenty  percent.233  Cheng  won  fifty- 
one  percent of the  vote  compared to Wu’s forty  eight  percent. 
Wu had  the  advantage of incumbency. He  had  name  recogni- 
tion.  The  Wu  family  had  produced three   commissioners  of  the 
county:  Wu’s grandfather, his father,  and  himself.234  Wu had done 
well for Taoyuan.  He had announced feasible  and intelligent plans 
for its future.  He had defeated Cheng in the 2009 election.  Taoyuan 
had  been  governed at the  executive  level by the  KMT  since 2001. 
With a number of military  bases in the area,  most voters  were pro- 
KMT. Wu seemed  to have momentum going into the final stretch  of 
the campaign  despite  being hurt  by an earlier  scandal.235  Wu’s loss 
was another indicator that the Ma administration and the KMT had 
lost more  voter  support late  in the  campaign. 
The  Tainan  and  Kaohsiung metropolitan mayoral  races  were 
easy wins for the  DPP  since both  were  DPP  strongholds. The  two 
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incumbent  mayors,  William  Lai  and  CHEN Chu,  both   won  by 
larger vote margins than in previous  elections.  Lai won with 711,577 
votes in comparison to HUANG Hsiu-shuang’s  264,636 votes. This 
meant  that Lai captured 72.9 percent of the total votes cast. CHEN 
Chu won 993,300 votes or 68.1 percent of the total whereas  her 
challenger won 450,647 votes or 30.9 percent of the total.236 In 2010, 
Lai garnered 619,897 votes to win, while Chen won 821,000 votes or 
52.8 percent of the  votes for her  win.237 
In the  case of these  two victorious  DPP  mayors,  incumbency 
seemed  to be an asset as in there  was no voter  sentiment to “throw 
out those in power.”  This was quite different from the KMT’s situa- 
tion.  Gas  explosions  in Kaohsiung a few months  earlier  had  hurt 
Chen’s reputation, but  this didn’t  seem  to matter. 
The DPP  won victories  in some other  lesser, but still meaning- 
ful,  mayoral  races.  The  DPP’s  candidate, LIN  Yu-chang,  won  in 
Keelung  (Taipei’s port city), which was a KMT stronghold. This was 
only the  second  defeat  for the  KMT  in this position  since 1950.238 
The KMT also lost the mayoral  race in Hsinchu,  another traditional 
stronghold.239 In Penghu  (Pescadores), the DPP won the top execu- 
tive job. In Kinmen  County  and Lienchiang County  in the Offshore 
Islands (very much KMT strongholds), the DPP was victorious.  The 
same  result  occurred in Pingtung  County.240 
Notwithstanding the overall  huge election  loss for the KMT, it 
could  cite  some  victories.  The  KMT  won  in  the  county  commis- 
sioner’s race in Taitung.241 The KMT retained its power in Hsinchu 
County  and Miaoli County.  The KMT won a number of victories at 
lower levels of government as well. KMT officials might have made 
the case that  the election  was not  a complete rout.  But that  would 
not  have  been  a convincing  argument and  few even  hinted  at this. 
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On the other  hand, smaller political parties  and independent or 
non-affiliated candidates made  a good  showing.242  This reflected a 
growing dissatisfaction among voters with both parties  and/or  polit- 
ics generally  in Taiwan. 
 
D.  Main Reasons Cited Locally for the DPP  Win and KMT 
Defeat 
 
Clearly  the media  and pundits  alike attributed the election  re- 
sults more to the KMT’s failings than to the DPP’s good candidates, 
strategy,  ideas, etc. But the main reason  cited for the KMT’s abys- 
mal performance was the economic  conditions. Despite the fact that 
the  rate  of GDP  growth  was increasing  and  gaining some momen- 
tum,  the  average  person  did  not  feel  this.  Wages  had  stagnated. 
Monthly paychecks had hit a fifteen year low. Young people were 
struggling.  Some even said Taiwan  had become  a haven  for foreign 
businesses  looking  for cheap  labor.  Meanwhile, the  prices  of daily 
necessities  were going up. There  was disappointment in the Ma ad- 
ministration’s vaunted ties with China  that  were  supposed to help 
the economy.  Few people  noticed  this supposed help due to the re- 
lationship and  many  were  apprehensive of  the  consequences  of 
closer  ties to China.  Finally,  the  public  was afraid  of opening  Tai- 
wan’s markets further, which the agreement with China  on trade  in 
services  and  Ma’s free  economic  pilot  zones  was perceived would 
do.243 
The  growing  gulf between rich  and  poor  in Taiwan  deserves 
special mention. According to an article  published just as the cam- 
paign was getting underway in the respected CommonWealth maga- 
zine,  the  gap  was at  an  all-time  high  with  the  top  one  percent of 
income  earners enjoying   the  lions’  share   of  Taiwan’s  economic 
growth.  The article’s author said that  this gap had created very dif- 
ferent  lifestyles  between the  rich and  the  less rich or poor  in Tai- 
wan,  and  had  fostered what  he  called  the  “biggest  class divide  in 
history.”  Furthermore, the government seemed  oblivious  to the 
problem.244  Clearly, this became  an election  issue that  hurt  the rul- 
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ing party  candidates. During  the campaign,  homelessness and pov- 
erty   amid   a   proliferation  of   luxury   apartments  and   the   rich 
engaging in conspicuous  consumption also became  an issue that op- 
position  candidates exploited.245  The Sean Lien candidacy  under- 
scored  this problem. 
Related but also standing  alone  as an explanation for the out- 
come  of the  election  was a loss of confidence in President Ma.  It 
was often cited that he was out of touch with ordinary people,  while 
thinking he could placate the public with the notion that improving 
relations with  China  was the  panacea for  improving  the  economy 
and to support otherwise would be a disaster  for Taiwan. As noted, 
Ma was also perceived as indecisive,  weak, and advised  by a small, 
insular  group  of officials that  were  better academics  than  problem 
solvers. The election  was thus a vote of “no confidence” in the 
president.246 
These  views were  confirmed by opinion  polls published after 
the election.  One survey found that seventy-four percent of respon- 
dents  said they were dissatisfied  with President Ma’s performance, 
up from just over sixty-six percent in June. Simultaneously, Ma’s 
approval rating  fell from  21.7 percent in June  to 9.7 percent, with 
only  5.7 percent of  those  age  twenty  to  twenty-nine saying  they 
were  satisfied.  (Since  the  youth  vote,  which was around sixty per- 
cent in previous  elections,  increased to seventy-four percent in this 
election,  this mattered.) According to the  polls,  53 percent of the 
population attributed the KMT’s defeat  to widespread disapproval 
of  the  Ma  administration’s “China   leaning  and  corporation-cen- 
tered” policies.247 
One  media  source  stated  the KMT’s election  loss was due to a 
combination of Taiwan’s economic  stagnation and the government’s 
lack of resolve  in governance. What  was cited were stagnant wages 
(declines  in some sectors  and with certain  groups,  in particular the 
young),  higher  housing  prices,  youth  unemployment, controversies 
over pension  reform,  concern  about  energy policies, and a backlash 
over  a proposal to increase  the  capital  gains tax. Also,  it said that 
the  government and  the  KMT  waffled  frequently on  policy  and 
were  woefully  inconsistent on important issues. One  example  was 
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the  government  functionaries’ pensions   –  the  government aban- 
doned  its position  due  to  a public  backlash.  Its  stance  on  nuclear 
power  was another, where  public  concern  caused  the  Ma adminis- 
tration to shift gears and thus created confusion.  There  were other 
government flip-flops.  According to  this  assessment, the  govern- 
ment   watched   opinion   polls  too  much  and  made   policy  that   it 
changed  when the polls were forgotten or shifted. In short, the gov- 
ernment lacked  direction and  determination in making  policies.248 
 
E. Reaction  and Interpretation of the Election by the Media 
and Officialdom in Other Countries 
 
The foreign  media  almost  in unison  saw the election  as a huge 
loss for the KMT and a big win for the DPP.  Foreign  news reports 
generally  dispensed the impression that  it was more  of a defeat  for 
the KMT than a win for the DPP. They often mentioned the unpop- 
ularity  of the Ma administration and its overreaching efforts  to im- 
prove   relations  with  China.249   Many   spoke   of  the   impact   this 
election   would  have  on  the  coming  2016  election,   suggesting   it 
would give the DPP momentum and up its chances considerably for 
a victory  in the  presidential contest  to  come  in just  over  a year. 
Many  also opined  that  the  election  would  have  a negative  impact 
on Taiwan’s relations with China.250 
Another interpretation was that  the Sunflower  Student Move- 
ment  and  other  protests during  the  months  leading  up to the  elec- 
tion exposed  President Ma’s weaknesses and fostered serious 
infighting  in the  KMT.  It also underscored the  fact that  the  econ- 
omy was still in trouble for the majority  of citizens. It even caused 
many to question the state  of Taiwan’s democracy. Ma’s open  con- 
flict with Speaker WANG Jin-pyng  made  this much worse.251 
The  foreign  media’s  coverage  on  the  election,  however,  was 
not as comprehensive as it was for previous  elections  in Taiwan.252 
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Part  of the  reason  for  this  was that  it was a local  election;  local 
elections  in other  countries simply do not as a rule attract much 
attention abroad. But, the world press, especially  in the West, also 
had a number of other  issues drawing  its notice  at this time. In the 
United  State,   the   media   was  focused   on  tension   and   possible 
standoffs  between Republicans and  President Obama in the  wake 
of the Republican victories in mid-term  elections.  The White House 
was also preoccupied with crises in the  Middle  East,  Ukraine and 
elsewhere.  In Europe and Japan,  economic  malaise  was a problem 
and  this drew  media  interest. 
In the U.S. and other  Western countries, there  was a noticeable 
lack of congratulations towards  Taiwan  for its democracy working 
well (especially  comments to the effect that the election  signified its 
democratization was advanced by  this  election  as was frequently 
heard  in Taiwan). The Western media seemed  to wish to avoid mak- 
ing any  comparisons with  the  West,  where  democracy was not  in 
good stead  with its citizens.  In the U.S., Europe and Japan,  demo- 
cratic governance was in doubt  as registered in numerous public 
opinion  polls and  by other  evidence.253  Democracy was not  doing 
well in the developing world either.254 Taiwan  was thus unique  and 
this should  have  been  noticed  more  than  it was. 
The  U.S.  government was  almost   mute   about   the  election. 
Some said it was not paying much heed.255  Alternatively, the White 
House  and the Department of State  did not want to talk about  Tai- 
wan or had too many other things on their plates. When asked to 
comment  about  the election,  the State Department’s spokeswoman, 
Jen Psaki, simply said “the U.S. would encourage Beijing and Taipei 
to continue their  constructive dialog.”256  This was nothing  new. 
Raymond Burghardt, chairperson of the American Institute in Tai- 
wan  (which  manages  U.S.  Taiwan  policy)  said,  perfunctorily, that 
relations  between  the  United States   and  Taiwan   would  remain 
close.257 Stephen Yates,  an advisor  on Taiwan  policy to Vice Presi- 
dent  Cheney  during  the  Bush  administration, confirmed the  view 
that the U.S. would not change its policy toward  Taiwan because  of 
 
 
253. See John  Micklethwait, “The  West’s Malaise,”  in The  World  in 2015 (London: 
The Economist, 2015), pp. 19-20. 
254. See Kurlantzick, Democracy in Retreat. 
255. William Lowther, “Rout of KMT takes  US by surprise,” Taipei Times,  Decem- 
ber  3, 2014 (online  at taipeitimes.com). 
256. Ibid. 
257. “US-Taiwan ties remain  close post-election: AIT chief,” Want China Times, De- 
cember  5, 2014 (online  at wantchinatimes.com.tw). 
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this election.258 No top U.S. official involved in making foreign pol- 
icy commented on the  election. 
China’s  reaction to  the  election  was at  first guarded. Neither 
government officials nor China’s news agencies said anything  of sig- 
nificance  immediately. China’s  media  reported on the  election,  in- 
cluding the results  – they characterized it as a DPP  win and a KMT 
loss of some import but said little more. Officials in Beijing had 
obviously  taken  a wait and see position  toward  the event.  An  offi- 
cial  in  Taiwan,  interpreting China’s  stance,  said  that  China  had 
adopted a “benefit yielding”  approach, or a policy of pursuing  eco- 
nomic ties as a priority  in its Taiwan  policy, and this had generated 
pushback in Taiwan.   He  later  suggested  that  Beijing  was not  cer- 
tain  what  to do at this point,  if anything.259 
An official of the State  Council’s Taiwan  Affairs  Office subse- 
quently  declared that  China  had  been  watching  the  election  and 
that  he hoped  that  people  in Taiwan  would continue to cherish  the 
“hard  won  fruits  of their  ties  with  China.”  In  the  same  article,  a 
scholar from the Taiwan Studies Institute of the China Academy of 
Social   Sciences   was   quoted  as   saying   cross-Straits    ties   may 
regress.260 
There  followed  even harsher comments. An article  in the offi- 
cial People’s  Daily  warned  the  DPP  to  “discard  fantasies” about 
pursuing  independence. The paper  noted  that China’s might and 
influence  have (and will) continue to expand  and as that happens it 
will have more  say about  cross-strait ties.261  Haiwai  Net, a popular 
website,   warned   the   opposition  against   “pressing   is  luck”   and 
pointed out  that  Taiwan  had  benefited considerably from  its eco- 
nomic relations with China. It specifically cautioned about  disavow- 
ing the 1992 Consensus.262  China Daily blamed  President Ma’s 
domestic  policies  for  the  election  defeat  asserting  that  his  cross- 
Strait  policy did not  cause  the  setback.263 
 
 
258. “No change in Taiwan-U.S. ties after local elections: U.S expert,” Focus Taiwan, 
December 5, 2014  (online  at focustaiwan.tw). 
259. This comment  was made  to the author by an official in Taipei  shortly  after  the 
election. 
260. Catherine Wong Tsoi-lai, “Cross  Strait  ties may stall, but no profound change,” 
Global  Times,  December 1, 2014 (online  at globaltimes.cn). 
261. “China  media:  Taiwan  election  ‘no rejection of Beijing,’ ” BBC  News, Decem- 
ber  3, 2014 (online  at bbc.com.uk). 
262. Ibid. 
263. Ibid. Interestingly the DPP’s former  representative to the U.S., Joseph  Wu, sup- 
ported this view. 
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A few days after  the election,  the Taiwan  Affairs  Office issued 
a statement denying  a report published in Taiwan  by the  weekly 
magazine  The Journalist, which claimed that China was making ma- 
jor changes  in its Taiwan  policy and that  it was thinking  of inviting 
the DPP  “chief”  for a visit. FAN  Liqing, the spokeswoman for the 
Office, declared, “policy toward  Taiwan  had not changed.”264 
At  this same  time,  China’s  state-run newspaper Global  Times 
praised  President Ma, citing his “sense of purpose” and his “intoler- 
ance  for  corruption”, which  they  noted  explained why he  had  so 
few friends.  The  paper  went  on  to  say that  Ma’s ambitions were 
lofty but  his concrete measures to reform  the  KMT  were  too  few, 
and  factionalism  and  nepotism were  “rife  within  the  party.”  The 
paper went on to criticize Taiwan’s “revolving door” politics and its 
populism.265 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The most widely heard  conclusion  about  this election  was: Vot- 
ers had lost confidence in the Ma administration and the KMT (in- 
cluding  handling   the  economy),   and  most  of  the  ruling  party’s 
candidates lost as a result.266  This contrasts with the KMT election 
setbacks  in the past when the party split over a specific candidate or 
decided  to “give” the DPP  a victory rather than  allow a KMT “re- 
bel”,  or  candidate the  top  party  leadership didn’t  approve of, to 
win.267 On other  occasions, the party was divided over its leadership 
or ideology.268  Never  was the economy  a deciding  issue. Never  had 
 
264. “China  may invite DPP  chief for a visit: TAO,” China Post, December 4, 2014 
(onlline  at chinapost.com.tw). 
265. “Global Times uses KMT defeat  to take  swipe at Taiwan  politics,”  Want China 
Times,  December 4, 2014 (online  at wantchinatimes.com.tw). 
266. See,  for  example,  “EDITORIAL: A  vote  of no  confidence in KMT,”  Taipei 
Times,  November 30, 2014 (online  at taipeitimes.com). 
267. This happened in 1994 in the Taipei  mayoral  election.  Rather than  support the 
New Party’s candidate or reach  some compromise, the KMT stuck with its own candi- 
date  who was unpopular and as a result  performed the worst in a three-way race. The 
KMT’s  position  was determined largely  by anger  with  the  New  Party  being  formed 
from  KMT  members that  were  unhappy about  President Lee’s  leadership. Ethnicity 
was also a factor.  See  Copper, Taiwan’s  Mid-1990s  Elections,  chapter 2. It  happened 
again in 2000 in the presidential election  when top party leaders,  notably  President Lee 
Teng-hui,  opposed the party nominating James  Soong, who was way ahead  in the opin- 
ion polls and would certainly have won as a KMT candidate. See Copper, Taiwan’s 2000 
Presidential  and Vice Presidential  Election,  pp. 11-18.  The  election  in November 2014 
was very different insofar  as it was the  KMT’s leadership and  brand  which hurt  KMT 
candidates. 
268. For several examples,  see Copper, Consolidatig  Taiwan’s Democracy, pp 13-19. 
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the party suffered  from such an array of centrifugal forces as during 
this election  campaign  with various  factions  opposing  the president 
(and  KMT chairman), thus engendering malaise  and lack of enthu- 
siasm and  direction in the  party. 
The  economy,  as noted,  was the  underlying problem. It  was 
showing many  signs of improvement during  the  campaign,  but  the 
good  news came  too  late.  Moreover, most  people  did not  feel any 
positive  change  in their  lives. The  restive  youth  mirrored the  pub- 
lic’s insecurity  about  the  economy.  They  lamented Taiwan’s grow- 
ing economic inequality, the lack of good jobs, and diminishing 
economic  opportunities – so they protested, which hurt KMT candi- 
dates. President Ma and the KMT had won the votes of young peo- 
ple  in recent  elections,  but  this  time  it was different. Some  KMT 
officials expected a backlash  from the students’  protest, but that did 
not seem to have any significance.  The widely held perception that 
big business in Taiwan was doing well while small businesses and 
common  people  were struggling  was a sidebar  that  hurt  the KMT’s 
message.  This eroded citizens’ respect  for the  business  community 
and discounted the usual positive effect of its support for KMT can- 
didates.269  Voters  also  thought more  in terms  of what  candidates 
could do locally to fix the economy,  which did not help the KMT.270 
Public  disbelief  regarding the  Ma administration’s claims that 
economic  ties with China had significantly improved Taiwan’s econ- 
omy made the economy  a bigger negative  for KMT candidates than 
would  have  otherwise been  the  case. Commerce with China  obvi- 
ously  prevented Taiwan’s  economy  from  even  slower  growth  and 
perhaps even going into recession,  but  it is unpersuasive policy ar- 
gument  to make when something didn’t happen. As a consequence, 
Ma’s pet economic  projects  were not perceived to have made  a big 
difference. To  voters,  there  was a huge  offsetting  negative:  these 
deals were seen as imperiling  Taiwan’s sovereignty.271 
 
 
269. Terry  Gou’s  endorsing candidates that  lost demonstrated this vividly. See Ou 
Hsiang-yi,  “2014 ELECTIONS: Terry  Gou’s picks fail to win seats,”  Taipei Times,  De- 
cember  1, 2014 (online  at taipeitimes.com). The Hon  Hai Precision  Industry chairman 
supported Sean  Lien,  Jason  Hu  and  Yang  Chiu-hsing;  all lost. He  even  pledged  large 
investments in their  districts  if they  won. 
270. Many of the economic  issues discussed during the campaign  were local projects. 
Economic problems  were  also framed  in terms  of what  candidates could  do for their 
districts. 
271. “Gov’t  method of pushing  trade  agenda  upsets  voters:  economist,” China Post, 
December  1,  2014  (online   at  chinapsost.com.tw)  and  “EDITORIAL:  Government 
needs  new direction,” Taipei  Times,  December 1, 2014 (online  at taipeitimes.com). 
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The second  major  factor  impacting  the vote was President Ma 
and the KMT’s leadership (and the two connected since Ma was the 
chairman  of  the  party).272   KMT  governance,  broadly   speaking, 
came into question. Even though  this was a local election  (or group 
of them were), dissatisfaction with the central  government mattered 
a lot. One  has to wonder  how the very favorable public impression 
of MA Ying-jeou  – who won the presidential election  in 2008 with 
more  votes than  any candidate running  for that  office since the di- 
rect  election  system was established; who garnered the majority  of 
votes from woman,  young people,  all minority  groups;  who won in 
almost  all the  voting  districts  (save  some  in the  south);  and  who 
won reelection singlehandedly in 2012 – could have changed  so 
dramatically.273 
Ma’s image,  as noted,  was damaged by events.  First,  was the 
global  economic  downturn. Then  a typhoon occurred.  Other  mis- 
fortunes followed.  During  this  campaign,  a food  scandal  hurt  his 
image. In the public’s mind, the Ma administration did not respond 
quickly  or effectively  to problems  it faced.  Part  of the  reason  was 
that  many citizens thought the national government could do more 
than  it was actually  capable  of doing.  Ma  and  his party  boasting 
during  the 2008 election  campaigns  about  what it could and would 
do, which reinforced the  impression (albeit  falsely)  of the  govern- 
ment’s  omnipotence  and  its  ability  to  resolve  almost  all 
problems.274  This scenario  was repeated in 2012. Politicians  in de- 
mocracies  routinely do this, but  in Taiwan  it is less accepted.  This 
clearly  influenced  voters  to favor DPP  candidates.275 
Meanwhile, the DPP,  reeling  from an election  defeat  and hav- 
ing been out of office since 2008, reverted to its previous  modus 
operandi  of criticism and protest – which the DPP  was always good 
at. The DPP  had the support of a sizeable portion of the media  and 
 
 
272. Ma assumed  the chairmanship of the KMT in 2008. There  was considerable ten- 
tion at the time over this. Wang Jin-pyng  sought  the position  and he was supported by 
Lien  Chan.  See Copper, The  KMT Returns  to Power,  pp. 52-53. In retrospect this ap- 
peared to be the  start  of party  disunity  and  opposition within  the  party  to Ma. 
273. See Copper Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election, pp. 72-75. 
274. This  had  an  impact  on  the  KMT’s  image  leading  up  to  the  local  elections  in 
2010, but  was offset  by serious  difficulties  the  DPP  faced  at the  time.  For  details,  see 
Copper, Taiwan’s 2010 Metropolitan City Elections,  pp. 8-9. 
275. Premier Jiang said this after  the election  as he resigned.  He mentioned specifi- 
cally that  “people are  dissatisfied  with the  administration’s policies.”   Many  observers 
had  already  said this and  others  echoed  it in the  wake of the  election.  See Shih Hsiu- 
chuan,  “Premier quits  after  landslide  KMT  defeat,” Taipei  Times,  November 30, 2014 
(online  at taipeitimes.com). 
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sufficient  money  to become  an effective  opposition.276  And  it kept 
at  it. It  portrayed Ma  as an  indecisive  president, and  his party  as 
having  regressed to its earlier  authoritarian character.277  It gradu- 
ally overcame its bad image in the wake of the Chen presidency and 
negated, at least temporarily, its fundamental handicaps to win the 
support of a majority  of the  electorate. 
Another factor  that  hurt  the  KMT’s  image  was the  fact  that 
President Ma heavily relied on advisors that were academics  (rather 
than   hardnosed,  experienced  politicians);   they  were  idealists278; 
they  were  self-confident; they  did not  accept  much  input  from  the 
various  KMT  “in-groups”. So as a result,  they  effectively  evolved 
into party  factions.  This caused  serious  party  disunity.  Party  elders 
and  many  KMT  stalwarts  came  to view President Ma as unwilling 
to  compromise and  inattentive to  party  solidarity.  They  also  saw 
him trying  to preempt the  DPP  on  various  issues either  to please 
pan-green supporters and/or  to undermine the opposition party’s 
platform. But this was an approach that no longer worked.279  More- 
over, it alienated many KMT members, notably  the heads  of party 
factions. 
The Ma administration also pursued policies that put Taiwan in 
good stead with the United Nations  and other  international organi- 
zations.280  But few in Taiwan  were impressed. Most citizens under- 
stood  that  the  UN  was not  Taiwan’s  friend;  it would  certainly  not 
 
276. It  deserves  noting  that  the  Liberty  Times,  a pro-DPP newspaper, is Taiwan’s 
largest  paper.  The  Taipei  Times,  also pro-DPP, is its largest  and  most  comprehensive 
English  paper. 
277. This was apparent to many  observers during  the  student protest in the  spring. 
See Michael  J. Cole,  “Taipei  flirts with ‘authoritaran lite’ amid  political  crisis,” China 
Policy  Institute Blog  (Nottingham University), May  1, 2014 (online  at  nottingham.ac 
.uk). 
278. A noteworthy example  was the issue of capital  punishment. President Ma con- 
tinued  the  moratorium on the  death  penalty  established by President Chen  Shui-bian. 
Ma’s first  minister  of justice  strongly  opposed capital  punishment and  even  said  she 
would “rather go to hell” than administer it. There  was a public outcry, since seventy to 
eighty percent of the population approved of it, and she resigned.  However, the use of 
capital  punishment in recent  years has been  quite  limited.  See “Taiwan  Death-Penalty 
Debate Could  Influence Asia,”  Crime  and Capital  Punishment, April  15, 2011 (online 
at cncpunishment.com). 
279. This statement is based on talking  with a number of KMT officials and support- 
ers and scholars  in Taiwan.  Regarding this as a practice  used  by the KMT in the past, 
see  Yuen-wen Ku,  Welfare  Capitalism  in  Taiwan:  State,  Economy and  Social  Policy 
(New York:  Palgrave  Macmillan,  1997). 
280. Taiwan complying with UN principles,  conventions, etc. has been commonplace 
under  Ma. This is mentioned in various  government publications; for example,  see The 
Republic  of China Yearbook 2012, pp. 184-86. 
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challenge  China’s views on Taiwan, support Taiwan’s democracy, or 
protect its sovereignty.  Thus many of Ma’s initiatives  in this realm, 
including  bills  sent  to  the  legislature, did  not  resonate with  the 
public. 
The corruption issue likewise hurt President Ma and the KMT. 
There  are  some  understandable explanations for this: The  corrup- 
tion  of the  Chen  presidency had  faded  from  the  public  mind  to a 
considerable extent;  government intrusiveness and spying on its cit- 
izens to a large degree  trumped concern  over corruption in Taiwan 
as the  WANG Jin-pyng  case  showed.  Leading  up  to  this  election 
there   were  a  number of  cases  of  local  corruption that  involved 
KMT officials and got media  attention.281  Adding  to the gravity of 
the problem in the months  leading  up to the election  several  inter- 
national agencies  reported corruption in Taiwan  had worsened.282 
The  issue of political  reform  had  a similar  negative  impact  on 
the  KMT  candidates. Initially,  President Ma’s reform  efforts  were 
mainly measures taken  to repair  the deterioration of civil and politi- 
cal liberties,  freedom of the  press,  and  ethnic  relations during  the 
Chen presidency. Subsequent reforms  were chiefly actions the pub- 
lic either  did not notice  or did not consider  very important. Or they 
were contradicted by actions  that  hurt  the Ma administration’s im- 
age, such as using government agencies  and/or  funds to help party 
candidates, increasing  government workers’ pensions  just before 
Election Day,  and  even  trying  to  provoke the  DPP  to  adopt  ex- 
treme  actions  that  would hurt  its image.283 
Ma’s policies and actions in improving  relations with China, for 
which he received  widespread acclaim (but  mostly abroad), and for 
making   the   Taiwan   Strait   no   longer   the   world’s  number  one 
flashpoint (place  where  a war might occur with participants, mean- 
ing  the  U.S.  and  China  using  weapons  of  mass  destruction)  also 
 
 
281. See “Corruption in Taiwan,”  Human Rights in Taiwan, no date given (online  at 
inthumanrights.com). 
282. Some  cases attracted considerable media  during  the  campaign  period.  One  in 
particular, a corruption scandal  involving  the  KMT’s nominee for  mayor  of Keelung 
and  the  sitting  City Council  speaker hurt  the  KMT’s image.  See “KMT  mulling  drop- 
ping Keelung  mayor  nominee amid corruption scandal,”  Central News Agency,  July 8, 
2014 (online  at  cna.com.tw). The  Keelong  case  hurt  the  KMT’s  image.  The  case  in 
Taoyuan,  in retrospect, did also. 
283. Kan Chi-chi, Tseng Wei-chen  and Jake Chung, “2014 ELECTIONS: KMT pan- 
dering  to retirees with bonus  money:  critics,” Taipei Times,  November 8, 2014;  “EDI- 
TORIAL: KMT’s Pork-barreling hurts reform,” Taipei Times,  November 9, 2014; 
“EDITORIAL: President playing wih fire,” Taipei Times, November 6, 2014 (all online 
at taipetimes.com). 
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faded  from  the  public’s mind.  In its place  grew concern  that  Ma’s 
China policies endangered Taiwan’s democracy and its sovereignty. 
Because  of the above-cited matters, whether KMT faults or co- 
incidences,  most of the analysts  that  explained of the election’s  re- 
sults  concluded  that   the   KMT’s  errors   and   poor   performance 
explain  what  happened. But  what  about  the  DPP’s  performance? 
The DPP’s campaign strategy was sound. The party offered good 
candidates. Most were well educated. (This used to be the forte  of 
the  KMT.)  It  ran  a professional, well-oiled  campaign;  in the  past 
this had generally  give the KMT an advantage. It avoided  disunity 
and  infighting  that  had  often  been  a problem. The  DPP  also stu- 
diously eschewed  certain  topics that would have hurt its candidates: 
CHEN Shui-bian,  independence, and opposition to the 1992 
consensus.284 
Except  for KO  Wen-je,  opposition candidates running  for top 
offices during  the  campaign  made  little  or no mention of Chen  or 
his presidency, which had been  a handicap for DPP  candidates for 
the  last 6 years.  They  did not  advocate his release  from  jail. They 
did not  visit him in prison.  In Ko’s case, Lien  made  issue of it but 
not  effectively.  Ko could not  avoid talking  about  the former  presi- 
dent;  so he focused  his comments on Chen’s medical  condition, of 
which well qualified  to speak of; this did not alienate voters. Ko was 
an independent  anyways. 
The DPP’s candidates (and  Ko too)  did not advocate Taiwan’s 
independence. They treated it almost as a taboo  topic. Instead, they 
spoke  in favor  of Taiwan’s  democracy and  sovereignty.  They  por- 
trayed  themselves as protectors of both.  This was a wise, and  as it 
turned out,  very effective  strategy. 
The  DPP  very adroitly  employed what  some  have  called  Tai- 
wan’s “new media.”  This term refers to Facebook, YouTube videos, 
tweeting,  and, in many cases, the use of “big data.”  Here,  the DPP 
was way ahead  of the KMT, as the latter  noted  after the election.285 
Its use of social media  was instrumental in winning the youth  vote. 
The youth influenced  other  voters and may be credited for the DPP 
 
 
 
 
284. A  number of election  observers noted  that  DPP  candidates carefully  avoided 
addressing  these  issues during  their  campaigns.  As a result,  observers also noted,  they 
were  not  in the  media  very much. 
285. See Yang Yi, “Sulking  KMT blames  ‘twisted”  press for election  defeats,” Want 
China Times,  December 12, 2014 (online  at wantchinatimes.com.tw). 
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candidates gaining  more,  and  generally  favorable, media  coverage 
during  the  campaign.286 
Finally,  the  DPP  gained  momentum during  the  campaign  pe- 
riod and kept  it up until Election Day. This is important in running 
any election  campaign  and it proved  especially  so in this one. DPP 
campaign  strategists did not  get sidetracked. Its party’s  candidates 
stayed  on message.  DPP  campaign  managers also employed some 
innovative  ideas and tactics late in the campaign.  The DPP’s victory 
was obviously bigger than  it would have been  otherwise because  of 
this.287 
 
 
A.    Consequences  of This Election in Terms of Its Impact on 
Taiwan’s Future 
 
The  most  widely  suggested   implications   were:  One,  it  fore- 
casted another win for the DPP  in the presidential/vice presidential 
and legislative elections  to be held in early 2016. Two, it would have 
a strong  impact  on Taiwan’s  relations with China.  Three,  it would 
have some impact on U.S.-Taiwan relations, although it was not cer- 
tain  what  that  would be. 
The overwhelming number of observers of this election  both in 
Taiwan  and  elsewhere predicted this election  would  influence  the 
2016 elections  just  a  year  and  two  months  away  in  favor  or  the 
DPP.288   They cited specific reasons  such as: the DPP  had momen- 
tum, the KMT was discredited in the minds of voters, and the KMT 
had lost its unity and the party  was in disarray.  Also many citizens 
felt the  KMT  had  been  in power  too  long and  this feeling,  it was 
assumed,  would persist  for at least  another year.  Finally, this elec- 
tion demonstrated that  the DPP  is not just a south  Taiwan  regional 
party; it was successful in middle and northern Taiwan, thereby giv- 
 
 
286. See Bao-chiun Jing, “KMT’s  Dubbing and  Surgeon’s  Victory:  Not  Just  Cross- 
Strait  Relations,” The  Diplomat, December 10, 2014 (online  at thediplomat.org). The 
author notes that it was, in particular, effective in Ko advertising his vision and the DPP 
announcing campaign  events.  KMT  leaders  recognized this after  the  election. 
287. This is evidenced in the  fact that  polls leading  up to the  time  after  which they 
could not be published showed  that  the DPP  was generally  doing better than  earlier  in 
the campaign.  Proof is also to be assumed  from the fact the polls were not accurate and 
fairly consistently  underestimated the  size of the  DPP’s  victory. 
288. Both  local  and  foreign  reporters came  to  this  conclusion.   See  for  example, 
“China  issue key to international coverage  of Taiwan  election,” China Post, December 
1, 2014 (online  at chinapost.com.tw). 
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ing it confidence that  it could  be a party  for all of Taiwan.289  Ko’s 
win in Taipei and the DPP’s victory in Taoyuan bolstered this view. 
In short,  the  DPP  seemed  to be a “new DPP.” 
Yet it may be otherwise;  in fact, it may be that this election  has 
little  meaning  in terms  of setting  a precedent or in predicting the 
results  of the  next  election.  How  so? 
First, Taiwan’s economy  will likely do better in 2015 than it has 
for the past three  years.290 More  importantly, economic  growth will 
affect more  people  and so will be noticed  by more.  When  a period 
of  steady  growth  is sustained, the  rate  of  unemployment  usually 
goes down  (as it has been),  wages improve,  and  the  rich-poor gap 
closes. Meanwhile, there  is most likely a growing realization, espe- 
cially among the youth, that Taiwan’s economic  woes have been felt 
in other  countries in the world, and that  these  woes were caused  in 
large  part  by globalization and  the  information technology revolu- 
tion—neither of  which  Taiwan  wants  to  shun.  It  should  also  be 
noted  that in the countries whose governments have taken  action to 
reduce  the rich-poor gap, have sacrificed economic  growth in order 
to do that.291 
Second, as noted,  this election  was a local one and the DPP has 
traditionally performed better in  local  polls.  In  fact,  it  was  once 
thought, especially  after  a major  DPP  win in local election  contests 
in 1997, that  it might become  the dominant party  in local elections 
while the KMT would perpetually win national elections.292 In fact, 
the  DPP  victory in the  2000 presidential election  interrupted what 
might  have  been  a trend.  If that  is the  case, plus the  fact that  the 
KMT’s victory in the  last local election  in 2010 has been  less than 
impressive  than the national elections before  and after, suggests this 
 
 
289. Wang Yeh-lih, “Future society indicator for politics,” Taipei Times, December 8, 
2014 (online  at taipeitimes.com). The author sees this as a “major  realignment” in sup- 
port  for the  two main  parties. 
290. See  “Institute raises  Taiwan’s  economic  growth  forecast  to  3.36%  for  2014,” 
Central News Agency, December 14, 2014 (online  at cna.com.tw).The Taiwan Research 
Institute made this assessment;  it predicted an even higher growth rate for 2015 because 
of a decline  in the  price  of oil and  other  raw materials Taiwan  needs  to import  for its 
argicultural and  industrial sectors.  Others anticipated higher  economic  growth  in Tai- 
wan based  on predictions that  the  world  economy  would grow faster  in 2015. 
291. Brazil is a case in point.  See Michael  Mandelbaum, The  Road  to Global  Pros- 
perity  (New  York:  Simon  and  Schuster,  2014), p. 135. It  is also  noteworthy that  the 
countries that  have  the  smallest  gap between rich and  poor  have  lower  GDP  growth 
rates  while the  countries where  the  gap is larger  have  higher  rates  of growth. 
292. Copper, Consolidating  Taiwan’s Democracy, pp. 24-25. 
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view still has validity.293  In this connection, most elections  (but  es- 
pecially local ones) are unique and must be viewed as sui generis. 
Underscoring this point, after this election  forty-three percent of 
respondents in a survey stated  those  candidates’ personalities influ- 
enced  for whom  they  would  cast their  vote—more than  any other 
factor.294 
Third,  the  belief  that  the  DPP  will win the  2016 election  as- 
sumes that  the DPP  candidates that  won election  will govern  effec- 
tively,   the   DPP   will   remain    unified,   and   that   it   can   again 
successfully hide from issues that would have hurt it in this election. 
These  are big assumptions. It is also presumed by those  advancing 
this view that  the  KMT  will not  be able  to recover  from  this elec- 
tion  defeat,  fix what  went  wrong,  and  do  better in 2016. Yet  the 
KMT has learned from election  losses in the past and has recovered 
to win subsequent elections.295   Furthermore, the  party  has a new 
leader.  President Ma will likely concentrate more on his legacy and 
forsake policies that caused the KMT to become unpopular.296 In 
addition, he is probably thinking  that in order  for historians to treat 
him  kindly,  his party  must  not  again  suffer  the  embarrassment it 
met  in this election.  This suggests  the  KMT  may not  be the  same 
party  in 2016 as it was in 2014. 
Another prediction cited by many media  sources  was that  Tai- 
wan’s relations with China  would  change  due  to the  DPP  election 
victory.297  This seems a reasonable forecast  given the  fact that  the 
DPP has long stood for an independent Taiwan (though democratic 
and sovereign  were the terms used in this election  campaign), while 
Beijing stuck to reunification as its “core  interest”—meaning it is a 
goal  China  is willing to  use  its military  to  attain.  As  noted,  on  a 
number of occasions and in several  different contexts,  DPP  leaders 
opined  that  Chinese  leaders  would make  concessions  and negotiate 
 
 
293. Copper, Taiwan’s  2010 Metropolitcan  City Elections,  pp. 49-59. It needs  to be 
recalled  that  the  DPP  won the  popular vote  in these  elections. 
294. This  poll  was  done  by  Taiwan  Thinktank. See  Emily  S.  Chen,  “Questions: 
Should  Taiwan  Change  its China  Policy?”  The Natioinal  Interest (blog),  December 29, 
2014 (online  at nationalinterest.org). 
295. In  1989 the  DPP  won  a significant  election  victory.  The  KMT  recovered and 
won  the  National Assembly  election  in 1991. It  lost  the  Legislative  Yuan  election  in 
1992 but won the gubernatorial and the Kaohsiung metropolitan mayoral  race in 1994. 
It performed below  par  in the  1995 legislative  election  but  won the  1996 presidential 
election.  See Copper, Taiwan’s Mid-1990s Elections,  chapter 1. 
296. See “The LIBERTY TIMES  EDITORIAL: Could new year usher in new Ma?” 
Taipei  Times,  January 5, 2015 (online  at taipeitimes.com). 
297. Again  both  local and  foreign  reporters said this. 
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with them  once they  had  won the  election.  They  also asserted this 
after  this election.298  But  Chinese  leaders  denied  this and  warned 
the  DPP  that  they  would  take  aggressive  actions  including  using 
military  force  if Taiwan  pursued independence.299  Thus,  it hardly 
seems the case that  Beijing will change its policies as a result  of the 
DPP  election  victory. 
 
 
B.    Facts and Evidence that can Help Anticipate Cross-Strait 
Relations  after This Election 
 
First off the question must be considered a serious one for sev- 
eral  reasons.  One,  in the past  the “Taiwan  issue” was the cause of 
armed  conflict  and  almost  war  on  two  occasions  (plus  there  were 
some near  conflicts).300 Two, any move toward  separation (or split- 
tism to use China’s  terminology) has grave  implications  for China 
domestically as its leadership fears secessionist  tendencies in Tibet 
and   Xinjiang   Province.301   Third,   China’s   military   takes   a  hard 
stance  toward  Taiwan  as the Taiwan  question relates  intimately to 
Chinese  nationalism and  patriotism, which the  military  feels is its 
purview. 
Currently,  these   conditions  arguably   have   greater  saliency 
given  that  China’s  relationship with  the  U.S.  is strained, there  is 
more  unrest  in Xinjiang  than  usual,  and  the  military’s  role  in Chi- 
nese  politics  may  have  been  enhanced by  greater  uncertainty in 
China over its future  economic  growth. Furthermore, Beijing’s rela- 
tionship  with the rest of the world (especially  the U.S. and its Asian 
neighbors) and  questions related to  political  and  other  reform  in 
China   will  also  be  factors   that   could  affect  the  situation  as  it 
persists. 
In counterpoint, President XI Jinping  is popular in China,  and 
although he  has  pushed  reforms  that  have  created uncertainty in 
the Chinese  Communist Party  and among  the population, most see 
 
 
298. See “DPP  gains should  prompt Beijing  to  modify  its approach,”  Want  China 
Times,  December 2, 2014 (online  at wantchinatimes.com). 
299. Faith  Hung,”China officials  satisfied  with  Taiwan  ties  but  warns  on  ‘bottom 
line,’ ” Reuters, December 16, 2014 (online  at reuters.com). 
300. The  Offshore Islands  crises  in 1954-55 and  1958 were  thought to  risk  an  ex- 
panded conflict between the U.S. and China at the time. A near conflict occurred in the 
1960s and  there  was a serious  face-off  in 1996. 
301. See  Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest  for  Supremacy:  China,  America,  and  the 
Struggle for Mastery  in Asia (New York:  Norton, 2011), p. 161. 
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his plans  for change  as both  rational and  necessary.302  Also,  since 
Xi has consolidated his power,  neither his policies  nor  his leader- 
ship are seriously  challenged.  One  might conclude  that  he is better 
able to deal with Taiwan than Taiwan is able to with China whether 
under  DPP  or KMT  leadership. 
Then  one  must  ask: What  are  China’s  intentions vis-a` -vis Tai- 
wan?  As a fast rising power,  China’s  external policies  are  seen  as 
assertive  and aggressive  and are often  perceived, especially  in Tai- 
wan, as much  worse  than  that.  This  is natural. But  one  must  ask: 
Does  China  plan  to  incorporate Taiwan?  And  when?  And  how? 
China  claims Taiwan  is its territory. Thus  there  is fear  of China  in 
Taiwan. But the issue has been exaggerated in Taiwan  – it certainly 
was during  the  run-up  to this election.  This was partly  due  to Tai- 
wan’s poorly  performing economy,  which made  it seem  especially 
vulnerable, but  also because  the opposition used  the fear of China 
as an effective  campaign  issue. 
What  are the facts? In 2005, China’s legislature passed  a “law” 
called the Anti-Succession Act. It stated  that if Taiwan continued to 
resist  unification over  a period  of time  China  would  employ  other 
than  peaceful   means  to  accomplish   that  task.  But  there   was  no 
deadline set. Recently Chinese  leaders  have spoken  of accomplish- 
ing “important tasks”  before  the 100th anniversary of the founding 
of the People’s  Republic of China—in  2049.303  This is almost  three 
and one-half  decades  in the future.  Ten years is a long time to pre- 
dict (or  plan)  in international politics.  Finally,  it is the  “dream” of 
both  China’s  leaders  and  its citizens  that  China  become  a major 
world power in the future,  perhaps even the predominant power.  If 
that  being  the  case, resolving  the  Taiwan  issue is perhaps a small 
part  of China’s future  global plan.304  Moreover, for China,  dealing 
with  the  “Taiwan  issue”  does  not  seem  a pressing  matter;  clearly 
Beijing does not want to use means other  than  enticements, mainly 
 
 
 
 
302. See “The Power of Xi Jinping,”  Economist, September 20, 2014 (online  at econ- 
omist.com) and Dexter Roberts, “Xi Jinping Is the World’s Most Popular Leader, Says 
Survey,  Bloomberg Businessweek, December 18, 2014 (online  at businessweek.com). 
303. “ ‘Chinese  dream’  draws  international attention,” People’s  Daily,  March  12, 
2013 (online  at peoplesdaily.com.cn). 
304. See Xi Jing ping, The Governance  of China (Beijing: Foreign  Languages Press, 
2014), p. 45. Xi mentions improving  cross-strait relations and  the  lives of Chilnese  on 
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economic  (which has been its policy to date)  to bring Taiwan “back 
into  the  fold.”305 
Then,   notwithstanding  Taiwan’s   economic   dependency  on 
China and the fear of the consequences of it that created an aura of 
panic during the campaign,  there  is little Taiwan can do about  it. In 
fact,  dependency will doubtlessly increase  even  with  the  DPP  in 
charge of local governments in most of Taiwan. The facts are these: 
China’s economy  over the past year accounted for nearly  a quarter 
of the world’s economic  growth.306 China is Taiwan’s largest trading 
partner—its largest export  market and its biggest source of imports. 
Taiwan   had  an  almost   $40  billion  trade   surplus   with  China   in 
2013.307  The  surplus  remains  large  and  it is important to  Taiwan. 
Taiwan’s  economic  dependency on  China  accelerated during  the 
CHEN Shui-bian  presidency and has only continued to grow since. 
It increased from  twelve  percent in 2003 to twenty–two percent in 
2013. Trade  with other  countries, relatively  speaking,  has decreased. 
In the  first half of 2014, sixty-four  percent of Taiwan’s  foreign  in- 
vestment went  to China.  Taiwan’s  most  important exports  – semi- 
conductors and computer parts –are linked through networking and 
the  global  production chains  of these  items  to  China,  which  only 
reflects  the  future  health  of these  industries.308 
Clearly, the DPP cannot  cut or even reduce  Taiwan’s economic 
dependency on China lest Taiwan’s economy  immediately spiral 
downward  and  with some permanence. Trying  to disassociate with 
China  economically (and  in other  ways since economic  issues can- 
not  be  isolated) will have  disastrous results  for  Taiwan  and  the 
DPP.  Most  citizens  in Taiwan  realize  this,  so the  DPP  has  to  as 
well.309 
 
 
305. This was confirmed after  the  election  by the  president of China’s  Association 
for Relations Across  the  Taiwan  Strait,  the  organization in China  that  manages  rela- 
tions with Taiwan.  He  spoke  of waiting for two years for approval of the trade  in ser- 
vices agreement and stated  that the election  would not change cross-Strait relations See 
Amy Chyan, “China  will wait 2 years for Taiwan: ARATS,” China Post, December 11, 
2014 (online  at chinapost.com.tw). 
306. “Who’s  driving  global  growth,”  Breaking News (Reuters), December 15, 2013 
(online  at breakingnews.com). 
307. “Taiwan,” in  2014 Report  to Congress (of the U.S.–China Economic and Secur- 
ity Review Commission (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing  Office, 2014), pp. 
470-82. 
308. Ibid. 
309. In fact, sixty-three  percent of respondents in a poll conducted by China Times 
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It is also worthy to note that the leadership of the DPP is in the 
hands of Chairwoman TSAI Ing-wen, who has pursued more proac- 
tive  policies  in connecting Taiwan  with  China  than  her  predeces- 
sor.310 Refuting her policies would likely split the party.311  Anyway, 
China has established manifold  ties with individual DPP officials. In 
2009, CHEN Chu visited Beijing and enlisted  China’s help in bring- 
ing the  Asian  games  to Kaohsiung.312   William  Lai has contacts  in 
China,   notwithstanding  his  well-publicized statement  during   the 
campaign  that Taiwan’s future  is for the people  of Taiwan to decide 
– his statement is patently false since Taiwan  is small, so its future 
will be  decided  by the  United States  and  China.  KO  Wen-je  has 
made  a host of trips to China  and has worked  closely with medical 
authorities there  on  a number of issues.  China  also  has  extensive 
contacts  with  lower  DPP  officials.  Thus,  it does  not  have  to  deal 
with the  party  itself per  se. 
 
C.   America’s Attitude to Taiwan and Its Future 
 
America’s  immediate response to the  election  news, as noted, 
was underwhelming. U.S. foreign policy officials said little. A quick 
response was obviously not needed;  there  was no crisis. Anyway the 
U.S. was preoccupied with other  foreign  matters. 
Pro forma  U.S. officials declared that  the  U.S. does  not  take 
sides in foreign elections.  But this was patently not true in Taiwan’s 
case.  Washington  has  influenced   previous   elections   –  President 
Clinton  did so in 1996 by sending  U.S. aircraft  carriers  adjacent to 
the  Taiwan  Strait  during  the  run-up  to  President LEE  Teng-hui’s 
presidential election   victory;  in  the  run-up   to  the  2000 election, 
Richard Bush, the head of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), 
stated  that  America’s  view on  Taiwan’s  China  policy  favored  the 
KMT. President George W. Bush  came to detest  former  president 
Chen for his provoking China at a time the U.S. was fighting terror- 
ism. Bush administration officials also abhorred Chen’s inciting and 
 
310. See Yan Anlin,  “Directions of Cross-Strait Ties Development After  Su Tseng- 
chang’s Election as DPP Chairman,” paper  presented at the 10th Symposium  on China- 
European and  Cross-Strait Relations sponsored by the  German Institute for Interna- 
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Tseng-chang, and  other  DPP  leaders  are  much  more  beholden to  pro-independence 
forces. 
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Times,  January 11, 2015 (onlline  at wantchinatimes.com). 
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exploiting  ethnic  ill will. Bush said this openly before  the 2004 elec- 
tion. During  the 2008 election,  the U.S. favored  the KMT campaign 
as clearly stated  by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Tom Chris- 
tensen  shortly  before  the  election.313 
The Obama administration continued this policy. In the fall of 
2011, a high-ranking U.S.  official was cited  in the  press  as saying 
(after  a visit from the DPP’s presidential candidate, TSAI  Ing-wen) 
that there  are “distinct  doubts  about  whether she is both willing and 
able  to  continue the  stability  in cross-strait relations.”314   In  2012, 
the Obama administration was seen as blatantly favoring  President 
Ma’s reelection, especially when Douglas  Paal, former  head of AIT, 
expressed on television  that the U.S. had “concerns about  the DPP” 
upon  his arrival  in Taipei.315 
Prior to the election  under  study here, there  were reports ema- 
nating  from Washington to the effect that  the U.S. would likely try 
to influence  Taiwan’s  2016 presidential election  and,  more  specifi- 
cally, would declare  a preference for the  KMT  because  of “linger- 
ing  doubts   about   the  DPP’s  cross-strait policies.”  U.S.  interests 
were  cited.316 
The explanation for this is that  to the Department of State  ad- 
vocating  Taiwan’s independence is tantamount to provoking a con- 
flict with China that the U.S. does not want. This view remains 
unchanged. Notwithstanding the  fact Washington has experienced 
tension  with China  before  (i.e. the  South  China  Sea, the  Senkaku 
(Diaoyu in Chinese) Islands,  China’s  claim to control  of air lanes, 
etc. . .), the U.S. needs  China’s cooperation in keep  peace  in many 
parts  of the world, to realize  its global environmental goals, and to 
maintain global financial  stability.  U.S. officials have regularly  said 
this.317 
 
 
313. See Richard C. Bush,  Uncharted  Strait: The  Future of China-Taiwan Relations 
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AIT  head,  Richard Bush,  was cited  in these  reports. 
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Washington’s “pivot”  to Asia  is a case in point.  Its origins,  of 
course,  reflect  America’s  concerns  about  a  rising  China.  But  the 
Obama administration has not  aggressively  pursued implementing 
it; it remains  in limbo  and  it is uncertain what  will come  of it.318 
Some argue that if it were a truly serious policy, Taiwan would play 
an  important role;  but  there  is no  evidence  this  will happen. The 
Obama administration obviously  does  not  want  to  alienate China 
over  Taiwan,  having  agreed  (with  Chinese  leaders) that  Taiwan  is 
one  of China’s  “core  interests.”319 
Having  said this, the media  and academe in the U.S. favor the 
DPP.  This is partly  for historical  reasons  (both  see the KMT as the 
party  of  CHIANG Kai-shek   who  “lost”  China  because   he  mis- 
placed the hearts  and minds of the people,  and due to KMT corrup- 
tion).  The  other  part  is ideological:  the  DPP  is a liberal  party,  the 
KMT a conservative party. Both the media and academe in the U.S. 
are liberal. But both also support President Obama’s  foreign policy, 
even  though  it does  not  lean  toward  the  DPP.320 
The 2014 election  in the U.S. provided meaningful encourage- 
ment to the DPP since its results showed how voters could rise up 
successfully against  the  party  in power  and  win an important elec- 
tion. This no doubt helped the DPP win votes. Also, Republicans 
represent strong  U.S. support for Taiwan  in a number of other  re- 
spects  – including  providing  the  country  with  arms  and  using  the 
U.S. military  to defend  Taiwan.  But it should  be kept  in mind that 
the election  “wave” in the U.S. will not be relevant in 2016 because 
the  U.S. election  occurs  after  the  Taiwan’s  that  same  year.  In any 
case, it is uncertain whether it will be a repeat performance. Fur- 
thermore, although Republicans favor  Taiwan  more  than  Demo- 
crats,  they  are  generally  generic  about  this  – as  in  they  support 
Taiwan,  but not one political  party.  Finally, Congress  has many in- 
terests  to  consider  and  cannot  focus  day-to-day on  foreign  policy 
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matters as  the  State   Department (which  is  clearly  dominant  in 
terms  of formulating U.S.-Taiwan policy) does. 
Thus, what influence  America has on Taiwan’s 2016 election  is 
difficult to predict.  It seems very unlikely it will have little or none. 
Washington could view the DPP  victory as likely to cause the Tai- 
wan  Strait  to  become   the  world’s  number one  flashpoint  again 
(which it seriously  does not welcome);  apprehension of this has al- 
ready  been expressed.321 Or America could assume an abiding  (but 
larger)  interest in Taiwan’s democracy, and remain  neutral or even 
favor the DPP.  That  decision  obviously  hinges on DPP  policies go- 
ing forward,  especially  its positions  on CHEN Shui-bian,  indepen- 
dence,  and  the  ‘92 consensus. 
 
D.  Observations About Taiwan’s Political Future Following the 
2014 Elections 
 
Hence,  what  impact  this election  has on Taiwan’s political  fu- 
ture  especially  the  2016 election   depends, to  a  large  extent,   on 
whether the DPP  can continue to overcome its fundamental handi- 
caps as it did in this election.  If it keeps  this in mind, it will have a 
good  chance  of winning  in 2016. It does  seem  to be aware  of this 
and  the  problems  it will face  on  the  road  ahead.  Related to  this 
question is whether or not  the  KMT  can fix what  has gone  wrong 
with  the  party  is  an  open  question. It  has  to  adopt   new  ways. 
Whether one or both parties  will adjust  better seems an open  ques- 
tion as well. Both  seem to be at a critical juncture in plotting  their 
futures.  This is underscored by the very close level of voter identifi- 
cation  with one  of the  two parties  and  a very large  (and  growing) 
segment  of undecided voters.322 
As a conclusion,  there  are some final observations that  should 
be highlighted from the next election.  One, whether Taiwan’s voters 
will become  accustomed to (and/or prefer) a frequent turnover of 
ruling  parties  or will they  opt  for fairly long periods  of one  party 
staying in power with the other  playing the role of a somewhat per- 
 
321. Some observers even opine  that  the Taiwan  Strait  might again, as it was before 
2008, become  the number one flashpoint in the world. See William Lowther, “Taiwan  a 
‘flashpoint’: US group,”  Taipei Times,  December 10, 2014 (online  at taipeitimes.com). 
322. In October, the last party identification survey taken  before  the election  showed 
a slight  advantage, though  a declining  one,  to  the  KMT  over  the  DPP  (26.3 percent 
down 1.2 percent from September versus 25.9 percent and up 0.6 percent). Undecided 
or independents were  45.6 percent, up 0.9 percent. See “Party  Identification Tracking 
Analysis  in Taiwan,  October 2014, Taiwan  Indicators Survey Research, November 11, 
2014. 
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manent  opposition is  uncertain.323   That   question  seems  up  for 
grabs.  Some  argue  that  the  former  makes  democracy livelier  and 
the  people’s  voice  heard  more  strongly.  The  latter  ensures  much 
better  long-term planning   and  seems  to  be  more   of  the  Asian 
model.324  Both  ideas  have  characterized other  democracies. 
Two, this election  is positive  proof  that  Taiwan’s democracy is 
alive and well. This may not appear to be saying a lot since Taiwan’s 
democratization has been  doing  well for some  time.  But  currently 
in  many  places  of  the  world,  democracy is not  faring  well;  this 
makes Taiwan unique.325 Thus, it seems likely that going forward 
Taiwan’s polity will be more noticeable and respected; maybe it will 
even  be seen  as a model  as it was in the  1980s and  90s. 
Three,  this election,  to a large  degree,  turned on the  issue of 
governance. This comports  with a global trend  and realization that 
the style of the polity, the quality of leaders,  and good public policy 
are of utmost  importance; and that  economic  growth,  social stabil- 
ity,  the  quality  of  life,  and  much  more  are  the  “dependent  vari- 
ables.”326 This may mean  that in the future  Taiwan’s electorate will 
pay more heed to good, intelligent leaders  that  possess a good edu- 
cation  and  relevant experience. This  may  mean  that  Taiwan  will 
continue to follow the Asian model,  where  discipline and efficiency 
are more  prized  than  in Western democracies. 
Lastly, populism  may have a possible  corrosive  impact  on Tai- 
wan’s politics.327 Populism  had a negative  impact on Taiwan’s politi- 
cal system and  its leadership in the  years  before  2008. With  TSAI 
Ing-wen  taking  over  the  leadership of the  DPP,  she  has  restored 
 
 
323. In fact, the argument can be made  that  Taiwan  has seen a rotation of political 
parties  frequently because  the parties  learned from their  mistakes  and quickly changed 
for the better and thus did not lose credibility  with voters.  See Copper, The KMT Re- 
turns to Power,  pp. 32-33 and  p. 113. 
324. See  John   Micklethwait  and   AdrianWooldridge,  The   Four  Revolution:   The 
Global  Race to Reinvent  the State (New York:  Plenquin, 2014), p. 138. 
325. See John F. Copper, “The Current State of Taiwan’s Democracy: Doing Well in 
Spite of Negative  Global  Trends,” in Chia-Kan  Yen and Economic Development in Tai- 
wan (Taipei:  Academia Historica, 2014), pp. 429-64. 
326. Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The  Fourth  Revolution, pp. 138-40. 
327. See Huoyan SHYU,  “Populism  in Taiwan:  The  Rise  of a Populist  Democratic 
Culture in a Democratizing Society,”  Asian  Journal  of  Political Science August  2008, 
pp. 130-50. The author notes that populaism in Taiwan “inclines”  its politicians  to build 
their  careers  on emotional issues while skipping  rational policy debates that  he feels is 
not a positive  trend.  Recently the American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan  warned 
that   populism   hampers  intelligent  economic   policy  and  growth.   See  “Commercial 
Times: Populism  hampers Taiwan’s progress,” Central News Agency, July 12, 2013 (on- 
line at focustaiwan.tw). 
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pragmatism as the most important guiding ideal for the party  going 
forward.328 This election  brought back populism  to some extent  and 
it may be a concern  if it grows and  becomes  the  central  theme  in 
coming elections. 
 
GLOSSARY OF SELECTED  CHINESE  NAMES 
 
 
 
Chen, Chu  陳菊 
Chen, Eric    陳瑞仁 
Chen, Hung-yuan 陳鴻源 
Chen, Shui-bian  陳水扁 
Cheng, Wen-tsan 鄭文燦 
Chu, Eric  朱立倫 
Fan, Liqing  范麗青 
Gou, Terry  郭台銘 
Hau, Lung-bin  郝龍斌 
Hsieh, Frank 謝長廷 
Hu, Jason  胡志強 
Huang,  Hsiu-shuang 黃秀霜 
Hung, Chung-chiu  洪仲丘 
Jiang, Yi-huah  江宜樺 
Ker, Chien-ming  柯建銘 
Ko, Wen-je  柯文哲 
Lai, William  賴清德 
Lien, Chan  連戰 
Lien, Sean  連勝文 
Lee, Hong-yuan 李鴻源 
Lee, Teng-hui  李登輝 
Lee, Si-chuan  李四川 
Lin, Chia-lung  林佳龍 
Lin, Yi-hsiung  林義雄 
Lin, Yu-chang  林右昌 
Ma, Ying-jeou  馬英九 
Mao, Chi-kuo  毛治國 
Siew, Vincent  蕭萬長 
Soong, James  宋楚瑜 
Su, Tseng-chang 蘇貞昌 
Tsai, Alex  蔡正元 
Tsai, Ing-wen  蔡英文 
Wang, Chien-shien 王建煊 
Wang, Jin-pyng  王金平 
Wang, Yu-chi  王郁琦 
Wu, John  吳志揚 
Xi, Jinping  習近平 
Wu, Po-hsiung  吳伯雄 
Yang, Chiu-hsing  楊秋興 
Yu, Shyi-kun  游錫堃 
Zhang,  Zhijun  張志軍 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
328. Jonathan Standing,  “Taiwan’s  Tsai puts  pragmatism over  populism,” Thomson 
Reuters, January 5, 2012 (online  at uk.reuters.com). 
